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Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel and Rachel Wheeler
After more than four decades of communist government and state monopoly over property rights
and the economy, Albania has moved quickly to privatize property and develop a democratic
government and market economy. In the political sphere, it has recognized opposition political
parties and elected legislative and executive government bodies. In the economic sector, the great
majority of agricultural land has been distributed to farm families, most state-owned housing has
been sold, and many industries have been privatized. Legislation passed by Parliament ensures
equal rights for all Albanians, women and men, including the right to own property.
Methods used to privatize state property attest to Albania’s commitment to a democratic and
egalitarian society: farmland was distributed to the households working on the ex-collectives and
state farms,
1 and housing was sold at a nominal price to the families occupying it. There are
social issues, however, that influence not only the potential role of property ownership in the
development of a democratic society, but also the true workability of some persons’ political and
economic opportunities. In this paper, we examine two of these social issues: gender and
ethnicity.
It is important that attention be paid to these issues because, assuming that property
ownership is a necessary condition for establishing a democratic market economy, the potential
denial to exercise those rights for a significant proportion of the population on the basis of gender
or ethnicity could undermine Albania’s attempts to establish a democratic society and dynamic
market economy based on equal opportunity.
1. IMPACT OF CUSTOMARY AND STATUTORY LAWS
ON GENDERED PROPERTY RIGHTS
Privatization of landed property in rural Albania officially began in 1991 when village land
commissions distributed the land of the agricultural collectives (called cooperatives) among
village families. According to legislation and implementing regulations,
2 farmland belonging to
                                               
* The research for this paper was implemented under the auspices of the Project Management Unit of the Immovable
Property Registration System with funding from USAID.
1 Not all state farm land was initially distributed to workers as private ownership; about three-fourths of it was given
in usufruct. In December 1995, Law No. 8053 converted these usufruct rights to private property. In total, approxi-
mately 90 percent of all agricultural land (ex-collectives and state farms) has been distributed as private property.
2 The Law on Land (Law 7501), passed by the Albanian Parliament on 19 July 1991, ordered the distribution of
agricultural collective land as private property, with restrictions on land market transactions.2
cooperatives was divided and distributed among village families; the amount of land a family
received was determined by the size of the household.
3 The land was also classified according to
its quality, with families receiving proportional shares of each quality.
4 The agricultural land
privatization law and its attendant regulations clearly state that the land is being given in private
property to the family. Only the name of the head of household appears on the allotment
certificate (tapi). Thus, the privatization process allocated farmland in family ownership, not to
individual persons.
The first section of this paper seeks to examine contemporary and pre-World War II
Albanian norms and attitudes with regard to family property rights within the context of rapid
and radical economic, legal, and social changes. The dynamic to be explored is the relationship,
within the context of Albanian family property, between family ownership of landed property
and the property rights of individual family members. The dynamic between market economy
and family landownership and how that may affect the property rights of certain sectors of the
population, both as family members and as individuals, are also be explored. The focus is on the
rural area where the majority of Albanians live and work and where legislation has established
family ownership of land.
Albanian legislation recognizes both individual and family landownership rights. Some
legislation, such as the Civil Code (passed by Parliament in August 1994), the usufruct law
(Presidential Decree No. 7512 passed in August 1991), and drafts of the Constitution (which still
needs to be approved by national referendum), recognizes private and individual property and the
right of all citizens to own and inherit property. Family landownership was tacitly established, as
we saw, in the Law on Land. In addition, the Civil Code classifies agricultural land as family
landownership (Article 222), not to be subdivided among family members except under specific
conditions (Articles 226–228). Thus, while a series of laws guarantees individual property rights
to both men and women, husbands and wives, sons and daughters, some provisions within these
same laws establish family (not individual) farmland ownership.
In addition to potentially conflicting situations within statutory law regarding property
rights, there is the difference between every person’s legal property rights and what people
perceive to be the proper allocation of property rights. In other words, there is a difference
between formal legal property rights and de facto or customary property rights. Results from
several surveys and unstructured field interviews reveal that customary traditions of patrilineal
inheritance and patriarchal norms, which were so fundamental to Albanian society prior to and to
some extent during the socialist regime, are re-emerging as the dominant form of social
structure.
5 While family landownership, as a tenure structure and as stipulated in Albanian
statutory law, does not necessarily exclude individuals from property ownership, customary
family ownership as practiced in Albania together with traditional norms and practices with
regard to family and gender may exclude some family members from exercising influence over
the use and disposition of family land; in other words, some family members may not be
                                               
3 Who constituted the members of a household, and therefore the size of the household, was determined by the
persons listed for that household in the Civil Status Registry as of July 1991. Household members included all
persons living under one roof and often also included male persons no longer living in the house, such as sons who
had migrated out.
4 This type of distribution resulted in fragmented farm holdings in the great majority of cases.
5 See Section 1.6.3
effective and functional owners. This situation can create a tension with regard to property rights
when persons perceive that their formal, legal property rights are not recognized in practice, that
is, are being denied them.
The potential of conflict around property rights, therefore, arises out of these two situations:
between individual and family property systems as stipulated in legislation, and between legal
and de facto practices regarding property rights. This paper does not argue that one property
system is superior to another, but rather that a society that is committed to democracy and to
equal opportunity should ensure that its property systems provide the same, adequate, and secure
rights to landed property for all its members. In other words, whether landed property is owned
individually or as family property is not the issue, but rather whether all persons have equal
opportunity to exercise their rights to property within that system.
Family-owned land is a prevalent type of customary ownership in different regions of the
world. One region where a number of studies on family landownership (e.g., Clarke 1979;
Barrow 1992; Bruce 1983; Dujon 1989; Crichlow 1989) have been undertaken is the Caribbean,
where it is called family land. The characteristics of family land in the Caribbean are similar to
those of family landownership in Albania. In both cases: (1) land belongs to the family, not to
one person; (2) there is a strong reluctance to alienate family property; and (3) family members
do not forfeit their claim when they leave the land. These characteristics offer security to family
members and ensure that they will not lose a basic and permanent means of subsistence.
These two family property structures differ in the subdivision of the land and in who in the
family can inherit family land. Under customary rules in Albania,
6 landed property belongs to the
family and male family members do not forfeit their inheritance claim to the land should they
leave the family household. Daughters, when they marry, leave their birth family households and
lose any rights to family land. Heirs are generally sons and their families, not daughters and their
families. In the Caribbean, in contrast, family land is inherited by all children, both sons and
daughters. Both mothers and fathers can bequeath land to their children, and both sons and
daughters inherit equal shares of their parents’ property (Barrow 1992; Bruce 1983).
Another major difference is in the subdivision of land. In the Caribbean, family land is not
formally divided among the heirs; rather, each heir has a proportional share of the land and
arrangements are made among the heirs as to who will use what part of the land (Bruce 1983).
Thus, heirs who remain on the land utilize the land they need or can cultivate, sometimes
incorporating shares of land of heirs who have migrated. Absent heirs, as already stated, do not
lose their rights and when they return may claim their share. This system allows usufruct rights
to be distinguished from tenure shares (the proportional shares) and for flexibility as conditions
change for specific members. As Crichlow (1989, p. 24) concluded, “[U]npartitioned family land
can serve the ideals of security and provide support for family members who most need it.”
In presocialist Albania, the custom was for each male heir to receive a specific piece of land,
particularly if he had his own family. This practice allowed sons to set up their own households.
Following the death of the father, if several brothers continued to live under the same family
roof, they might continue to farm together and not formally subdivide the land. Each heir,
nevertheless, would know which part of the family property was his, could eventually subdivide
the land, and knew what land he could pass on to his own heirs. It is still too early to know how
                                               
6 For a written version of one set of Albanian customary law in both Albanian and English, consult Gjecov (1989).4
land subdivision among heirs will be administered in Albania—family landownership and
private property have been reestablished only recently. Rules for the subdivision of agricultural
land (designated as agricultural family land) are spelled out in Articles 207 and 226 of the
Albanian Civil Code (1994).
In short, this comparison of family property in the Caribbean and presocialist Albania
demonstrates that both systems hold family landownership as sacred and as a means of ensuring
family subsistence and independence for present and future generations. Where they essentially
differ is in the degree and type of control that individual family members have over family-
owned land. In the Caribbean, both men and women have the same rights to family land, which
is not formally and definitively subdivided among heirs. Prior to collectivization, women in
Albania had some access rights to family-owned land but did not have the right to own, control,
or inherit family property; sons in Albania inherited ownership rights to specific pieces of family
land, property which they and their families worked and which would in turn be inherited by
their sons.
1.1 FAMILY STRUCTURE IN TRADITIONAL ALBANIA
Customary Albanian society before, during, and even after its incorporation into the Ottoman
Empire
7 was largely rural and based on the extended family. A person’s identity, welfare, and
future were determined by his or her family and the decisions made by that family. As long as
the family was physically safe and its agricultural base (land and livestock) secure, its family
members were provided for. The Albanian family was patrilineal and patriarchal, and the roles
and status of its members were strictly sex and age segregated.
8 The basis of social organization
in traditional Albania was patrilineal descent groups or clans, called fis. These fis, consisting of
extended families living in close proximity, occupied clearly defined territories (Vokopola 1968;
Whitaker 1976). Each fis had a different surname.
Albanian society was traditionally governed by oral customary codes, called kanun. The
kanun differed slightly from one region to another;
9 however, they all shared many common
values, norms, rules, and practices. The  kanun regulated behavior and specified rights with
regard to both personal and landed property within the nuclear family, among extended family
members, within the fis, and with other fis. The regions had different historical, economic, social,
and political conditions which affected these kanun and family landownership customs. When
discussing prevalent tradition and customary practices, contemporary Albanians continue to refer
to these kanun.
In the northern mountainous region, village economy was primarily livestock-based with
minimal crop production and commercial activity. In addition, northern Albanians fiercely
                                               
7 The Ottoman Empire occupied and ruled that part of southeastern Europe which was peopled by Albanian ethnic
tribes for close to 500 years. The country of Albania came into existence in 1912 as the Ottoman Empire collapsed.
8 Most of the literature available in English regarding kinship, family relations, and property rights in Albania discuss
customary systems in the northern region since the late nineteenth century. Because of the small amount of available
literature regarding these topics, generalizations to other regions of Albania should be made cautiously.
9 These different oral kanun were not written until the early twentieth century. The best known is the Kanun of Leke
Dukagjini; others are the Kanun of Skanderbeg, the Kanun of Muse Ballgjini, and the Kanun of Idriz Suli.5
resisted Muslim laws and practices throughout the Ottoman occupation. The prevalent kanun in
the north has been the well-known Kanun of Leke Dukagjini, dating from the Middle Ages. The
landownership and administration provisions of the kanun state that landed property belongs to
the family and is handed down over generations through the men in the family—women do not
inherit either land or other real property. The central region also had various customary codes
including the Skanderbeg kanun. In the south, there was more economic activity, particularly
commercial activity, and Muslim influence was stronger, penetrating traditional society there.
The southern region also had several variants of the kanun, some significantly influenced by
Muslim law, such as the Idriz Suli kanun. In the southern region, for example, large landowners
would give part of their property to their daughters. This would suggest that in the south, in the
majority of households with little land to distribute, only sons inherited land even though
daughters may have had some inheritance rights.
10
The heads of clans and of the household itself were all men (Whitaker 1976) and were
referred to as “the brotherhood” (Begolli 1994). Marriage practices were exogamous; to marry
within the group was considered incestuous (Durham 1928). Thus, a man married a woman from
another fis who was usually also from another community. Since the fis is traced only through
the male line vertically (up from son to father and uncles to grandfather) and horizontally (across
brothers and their children), relations through the mother are not considered blood ties.
According to Durham (1928), disregard for the mother’s side of the family would sometimes
result in marriages between close relatives such as first maternal cousins.
Residence patterns were patrilocal, that is, the groom and his bride resided in the home of
the groom’s father until the time that the new couple had the resources to establish their
individual household. Generally, one of the sons inherited the family home. In previous
generations, particularly in the north, sons would separate from the father only with his consent
or after his death. Households, therefore, were often large families: father and mother, their
married sons and their families, as well as unmarried sons and daughters. If the father’s widowed
mother lived with them, the family could consist of four generations. Thus, the household was an
extended family, both vertically (consisting of several generations) and horizontally (several
married brothers living under the same roof). While vertically extended households are still
common, it is now rare to encounter several married brothers and their families living together.
11
What was of basic importance in this social structure was the primacy of the family (as
opposed to the individual) and its patriarch (eldest male as ultimate and only authority).
According to customary norms, individuals did not have a civil, juridical, and social personality
but through the head of the family; the family was considered the cell of society, not the
individual. In addition, within the family and the fis, only the male blood line was of significance
in defining the social units: the male members of the fis belonged to “the branch of blood.” The
women belonged to “the branch of milk,” vessels for the production of male heirs (Backer 1983).
                                               
10 Customary practice in Macedonia, which was also under the Ottoman Empire for several centuries until the 1910s,
is similar in that both sons and daughters have had legal inheritance rights, but in practice sisters give up their right to
family property and brothers effectively inherit all of the land and real property.
11 During the communist period, new couples found it beneficial to register their marriage in the Civil Registry Office
of the local komuna. The couple would then be eligible to receive social benefits as a separate family.6
1.2 WOMEN’S STATUS IN TRADITIONAL ALBANIA
Traditional patriarchal values and norms in Albania segregated behavior, privileges,
responsibilities, duties, and rights by gender and recognized only male authority. The head of the
household (the patriarch) demanded absolute respect; his power was granted by the fact that he
was to act in the best interest of the family at all times, as stipulated in the kanun (Gjecov 1989,
p. 16). His authority also derived from his economic power as the dispenser of family earnings
and his duty to be fair toward all (Begolli 1994). The strength, power, and legitimacy of the
patriarch was based on the fact that his decisions and actions ensured the well-being of the
family and, therefore, of all its members.
Women were relegated to an inferior status, with few if any social rights, and their treatment
and behavior were governed by the  kanun. For example, according to the Kanun of Leke
Dukagjini, women were regarded as servants of all the males in the family: “small wineskin
which bear burdens and hard work.” Thus, a husband had the right “to beat and bind his wife
when she scorns his word and orders” (Gjecov 1989, p. 44). Men had ultimate control over their
wives and unmarried daughters, including the power to reprimand them severely for failing to
observe the rules established by society (Hasluck 1954).
Despite the appearance of homogeneous customs, adherence to and belief in this patriarchal
structure has varied and continues to vary within Albania. While urban areas and southern
Albania have been less patriarchal and more open to the idea of gender equality, the northern
mountainous region has maintained much of the  kanun’s norms and practices (Del Re and
Gustincich 1993).
Survival of strongly gender-segregated roles is also visible in the ethnic Albanian areas of
former Yugoslavia such as Kosova and northwestern Macedonia. Reineck (1991) documented
that ethnic Albanian women in the Kosova region still (at least up until the late 1980s) uphold
their honor through proper decorum, such as a quiet, controlled demeanor as well as an
enthusiasm for performing domestic labor. The patriarchal nature and traditional family practices
of Albanian households in contemporary Macedonia have also been documented (Grossmith
1976, 1977).
1.3 CUSTOMARY PROPERTY RIGHTS
Two kinds of property have existed in the extended Albanian family: (1) property that belonged
to the extended family as an entity and (2) the personal property of individual family members.
Land and houses were considered family property and therefore belonged to the family as a
whole. Whitaker (1976) observes that “there was no testamentary law since the individual
possessed nothing to will. Inheritance was by the family and not by the individual.” But in reality
only men were considered functional owners and had control over real property. According to
Begolli (1994), since only men were considered to be true (blood) family members and exercised
rights to and control over family property, women had rights only to personal property.
Within this customary tenure system, family members had rights to landed property through
their relationship to the family head. Anything that the head of the family, typically the husband,
acquired became the property of the family and was used for the benefit of the family. Hasluck
(1954) states that every individual was encouraged to feel that all property and all concerns of the7
family were his own. This system of beliefs enhanced the strong sense of community that has
formed the basis of family solidarity and has also extended to the whole fis structure.
The Albanian woman did not have the right to inherit from her father (Gjecov 1989, p. 28)
nor from her husband (Gjecov 1989, p. 52)—neither the house, nor the land, nor household
items. As the Dukagjini kanun states: “The Albanian woman does not inherit anything from her
parents—neither possessions nor house; the kanun considers a woman as a superfluity in the
household” (Gjecov 1989, p. 28). The fact that daughters could not inherit any property assured
their birth families that they would not claim any part of their father’s estate, particularly once
they married. It was thought that if a married woman claimed property from her father’s estate,
her husband (who belonged to another clan) would consequently control that piece of land. It
was also believed that political structures based on localized clan ties would become
undermined, since the borders between local communities would be less clear. Similarly, if a
wife was entitled to her husband’s property, a woman of “foreign” blood would have reason to
interfere in village affairs—an unthinkable idea in traditional Albanian society (Backer 1983).
In Begolli’s (1994) description of customary Albanian law in Kosova and northern Albania
in the 1950s and 1960s, a woman’s personal property usually consisted solely of gifts; such as
clothing and gold which she received from both her own family and that of the groom during her
engagement and at her wedding. These items were considered of limited term value because, in
practice, clothes eventually deteriorated and gold was sold when times were hard (Reineck
1991).
The father’s estate, therefore, was commonly divided equally among his sons. If a man had
no sons, usually all his property went to his closest male relatives, most often his brothers or
male cousins (Durham 1928; Gjecov 1989, p. 52). Thus, only those men who were directly
related to the patriarch (e.g., sons and brothers) or related through a male relative (e.g., sons of a
brother or sons of sons, but not sons of daughters) could inherit landed property.
Sale of landed property was also regulated by the kanun. The household head first offered
land for sale to the closest male relatives on his father’s side. If no male relative agreed to
purchase the land, then it could be offered to the neighbor, and then to anyone else in the village.
If no one in the village bought it, the owner was free to sell to any buyer (Gjecov 1989, p. 104).
The situation of women without husbands could be quite tenuous because of their lack of
property rights and their economic dependence. A widow had the right to remain in her
husband’s house and on his land, provided she did not remarry, until her eldest son reached the
age of fifteen (the age to carry arms), at which time he had the right to inherit and manage the
property. A widow with no children would return to her birth family, perhaps to live with one of
her brothers, and she would be allowed to take with her the personal property she was given
during her engagement and wedding (Begolli 1994). As Durham (1928, pp. 73–74) observed at
the beginning of this century:
Should a man leave a wife [without] children she is of no account and must leave the house and
return to her father’s house.... If the widow has a daughter and no son she has the right to remain
a hundred days in the house, then if the heirs order her to leave she must go, but her daughter
remains as part of the heir’s household.... In practice the widow may remain in the house as
“levirate wife”.... A married daughter has no right to anything whatever of her father’s property;
she no longer belongs to his house.8
This description of Albanian women’s condition up to the 1940s draws a very bleak picture
of their prospects to gain ownership rights to land or to improve their status. Some women,
however, were able to escape the limitations imposed on persons of their sex. Definition of
gender within a society, after all, is not based solely on sex; cultural norms and practices also
determine gender. In Albania, this was illustrated by the existence of virgjeresha, vowed women.
Women theoretically did not possess honor, could not participate in blood feuds (also known as
prestige games), and could not inherit property from their fathers; these privileges were reserved
for men. However, Albanian cultural practice did allow certain women to become men in the
cultural sense. Usually this would occur under particular circumstances, such as an unmarried
daughter in a family without a male heir. Virgjeresha dressed and behaved like men and swore
perpetual virginity (Begolli 1994). These women were thus considered to be men and allowed to
participate in blood feuds, represented their family’s name in public space, and inherited their
family property (Durham 1928). Only by swearing herself to virginity and becoming a
virgjeresha, therefore, was an Albanian woman allowed to claim some rights that only men had.
By entering into and supporting the male prestige structure, these women shunned all elements
of femaleness (Shryock 1988). The Albanian female virgin became culturally male.
1.4 PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GENDER AFTER PRIVATIZATION
The remainder of this first section on customary and statutory property rights describes the
gender-differentiated effects of recent property privatization and customary family and tenure
practices. This description is based on an examination of the legal basis for privatization, the
actual process of distributing and conferring property rights to agricultural land, some field notes
from unstructured interviews, and the results from two recent surveys. The objective is to explore
women’s current rights to landed property (both legal and de facto) as compared to men’s and to
investigate women’s prospects for gaining the same property rights as those held by men,
whether it be to family or individual property.
As described previously, when agricultural cooperative land was distributed in the early
1990s, land was given as private property to village families. Only one name was listed on the
property title (tapi) given to the family: the head of household. One would expect the majority of
household heads to be men, but would also expect a good proportion of households where the
husband had died or left. When we visited villages and looked at the distribution process in 1992
and 1993, however, we found that very few women were signing the tapi.
Reviewing the documentation of several villages we found that only between 1.6 and 3
percent of the tapi were signed by women. An exception was a mining village within Tirana
district (central hills region) where 15 women out of the 204 families (7 percent of the families)
had signed the tapi as representative of their families. This high number is due to the fact that
there are many widows in the village because many of the men had been killed in coal mine
accidents.
Inquiries into the structure of the female-headed households we encountered revealed that
they do not have an adult male—no husband, father, nor adult son. These women are widows
who either live alone, with an adult single daughter, or with young children. The low number of
female-headed households reveals the customary nature of Albanian families and their continued
patriarchal character. When the family patriarch passes away, it is customary for one of his sons9
to assume the position of family head. Thus, women seldom assume headship of the family. In
addition, divorced and single (never married) women above a certain age are rare in Albania.
These  scattered cases regarding the land distribution process suggest prevailing gender
differences with regard to who has rights to family property. Conversations with villagers, both
men and women, as well as with Albanian social scientists, further reveal contemporary thinking
with regard to this issue in rural Albania. The following section, taken from conversations and
informal interviews in three different regions (south, central, and north), illustrates that while this
gender difference is prevalent throughout Albania, there are regional variations.
1.5 REGIONAL VARIATIONS REGARDING WOMEN’S STATUS AND PROPERTY
RIGHTS
As already mentioned, Albania is considered to have three geographic regions, which correspond
to different cultural and social structures, particularly to the level of adherence to traditional
norms and behavior. Topographical and agricultural differences can also be found.
1.5.1 Northern region
The northern region is dominated by the mountainous area bordering the republics of
Montenegro and Kosova (of Yugoslavia). There is little arable land and the families are more
dependent on livestock than on crops. The Dukagjini Kanun was, and apparently still is, the
observed kanun in this area (Del Re and Gustincich 1993). Some villages (traditional summer
grazing areas) were established between 80 and 100 years ago as a result of hiving-off from the
villages of origin at lower altitudes. Although summer grazing areas were communally owned
and used, the people who established villages on them divided the land among themselves when
they decided to live there year-round.
Typically the villages consist of a scattering of houses that are far apart from each other and
accessible only by rugged footpaths which are often not passable. When houses are found in
clusters they are usually inhabited by families of the same fis. Good quality agricultural land in
this area is minimal and livestock (cattle, sheep, goats) is the principal activity. Infrastructure in
the northern areas, such as roads, access to markets, and means of communication is relatively
undeveloped. These constraints discourage commercial farming.
Distribution of land in these villages was not done according to the 1991 Law on Land (Law
7501), but rather families usually took the land that they or their forebears had owned prior to
collectivization. Through the mid-1990s,  tapi had not been issued in the entire  komuna of
Kelmend, for example, because land distribution was at variance with the law and the District
Land Commission did not permit their issue. The elders and district agronomists interviewed
believe that the conflict between the community and the District Land Commission will
eventually be resolved and tapi will be issued in the names of family representatives, which are
always the eldest male of the family. Villagers feel that security of tenure comes from the
knowledge by all members of the community as to who the rightful owners of land are rather
than from having an official tapi.
The northern mountainous region of Albania is commonly cited, both in ethnographic
literature and by Albanian people today, as having maintained more Albanian traditional customs
than the other regions due to its location and relative isolation from outside influences. Women10
wear traditional dress such as brightly woven aprons and headdresses over meticulously plaited
braids, while widows saturate themselves in black.
The custom of inheritance in the villages of this northern area is for the land to be passed on
to sons or to other male relatives. Villagers affirmed that, according to the kanun, daughters can
inherit only personal property. (Several villagers remarked that in the cities and larger towns on
the coast, both daughters and sons inherit landed property.) Usually, if there are no sons, then
nephews (sons of father’s brothers) and grandchildren (of deceased sons) inherit the land. A
common division process among heirs is for the oldest son to divide the land and for the
youngest brother to pick first which parcel he wants. If there is a disagreement among the
brothers, then the village elders generally decide how the land is to be divided. When brothers
continue to live together under one roof, the land is farmed together. If a brother moves out and
sets up his own household, he is assigned his own land.
Since land customarily comes into a household through the husband, it belongs to his
family. When he dies or if the couple divorces, the wife has no claim on the land, except to
support her husband’s children while they are young. To the people in these northern mountain
villages, the concept of women’s owning, inheriting, or buying land is foreign.
1.5.2 Central region
The central region of Albania is distinguished for its high levels of agricultural activity. Plains
dominate the topography of the district with highly intensive and diversified agriculture. Main
crops are wheat, maize, alfalfa, and vegetables, with olives and fruits also being grown in the
foothills. Its central location, better infrastructure, and higher levels of urbanization suggest that
patriarchal traditions may be relatively weak compared to the northern region.
Interviews in several central districts, however, seem to indicate that attitudes regarding
women’s and men’s property rights are similar to those in the north. In a village of Tirana
district, for example, an interview with an older couple who have several grown children reveals
customary attitudes toward both family property and the rights of individual members. When we
arrived at the family’s home, the father and the younger daughter, who is not married, had just
finished plowing the 1.5 hectares they received from the land distribution process and were
planting the fields. Father and daughter do the field work while the mother takes care of the
animals.
The villager and  his wife have three children, two daughters and one son. The older
daughter is married and lives elsewhere; the son works as a driver in Tirana. When asked what
will happen to the family farm when he dies, the villager insists that, according to his will, all of
his property (land, animals, house and everything in it) will go to his son. His daughters,
including the one who works in the fields with him, will receive nothing. If his son wishes to
give his sisters some property (if, for example, they are very poor), he has the right to do so. The
younger daughter appeared to have no objection to her father’s plans for passing on all the land
to her brother.
In another central region village, we interviewed a family composed of a husband and wife,
two sons, and three daughters. This family received 13 dynum
12 of land, including an olive
                                               
12 One dynum is approximately 0.1 hectare.11
grove, in the distribution process. The house garden is planted with vegetables; the wife manages
this plot and she and her daughters put in most of the work, though the husband and son help.
The other land is planted with wheat; the husband manages those parcels and the whole family
works on it. The two younger children take care of the goats. The older son is working as a driver
in Italy. Of the three daughters, the eldest is married and the other two are still at home.
When the wife was asked her opinion about the inheritance law (that spouse and all children
inherit equally), she said that only sons should receive land because daughters will marry. But if
a daughter marries a poor man, her family can help her with products from its farm. Even if the
man is rich, his house, land, animals, olive trees, and everything on the land will pass to sons and
their families, not to daughters. One of her daughters, when asked, agreed that she has no rights
to her birth family’s land.
When presented with the hypothetical case of a widow with young children, the daughter
said that she should be allowed to keep her husband’s land to support herself and her children,
with the help of her husband’s family, until the children are old enough to manage the farm, at
which time they would take over its ownership. A widow with no children, however, cannot stay
on her husband’s land, but must return to her birth family. The father agreed with his wife and
daughter. He said that his sons, even the one in Italy, are the only ones who have inheritance
rights to their family land. He will work the land while he can; otherwise he will hire someone to
work the land until his sons take over the farm.
1.5.3 Southern region
The topography in the south is varied: fields, hills, and mountains. Agriculture comprises both
crop and tree production as well as livestock, particularly dairy production. Fishing is also an
important activity which provides many of the coastal  komuna with a substantial source of
income. The women of the south in general are frequently cited as being of “stronger character”
than other women of Albania. They are considered, and consider themselves, more independent
than women in other regions and as having an equal status with their husbands within the
household.
Women from a village in the southern district of Korça, for example, affirmed that the man,
as husband and father, is head of the family in formal occasions and for official reasons (such as
signing of documents). They also state that in reality, however, the whole family, particularly the
wife, participates in the decision-making. When husbands and sons migrate to Greece, the wife
or mother takes over management of the farm. She is de facto head of the family and makes the
decisions. With regard to landed property rights, these women in southern Albania feel that all
family members, daughters as well as sons, wives, and husbands, have equal property rights to
family-owned land. Citing the case of a recent divorce in the village, the couple divided all their
property, including the land—the woman received 4  dynum of land. However, they
acknowledged that in practice when a daughter marries and leaves her family, she leaves her
rights to her birth family’s land behind. In other words, she cedes her shares to her brothers.
While in the central and southern regions the various kanun are not generally recognized as
official traditional law as in the north, it was noticed that people in both regions upheld certain
traditions that are reminiscent of kanun law and similar to attitudes displayed in the north. For
instance, informants consistently maintained that one of the most important virtues a man could
have was that of honor. In a couple of cases the villagers thought that honor was more important
than life itself. Villagers were eager for their daughters to marry at a young age, since there exists12
the risk of their remaining unmarried if they wait. Some discussions described the role of
middlemen in arranged marriages, suggesting that marriages are still decided by parents. These
incidences imply that some Albanian traditions still have a strong influence.
1.6 SURVEY RESULTS REGARDING CUSTOMARY PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES
This section presents results from two 1995 surveys regarding different aspects of property rights
as determined and affected by customary practices, particularly the role of gender in the
customary family property tenure structure. The two random sample surveys were administered
in 1995 under the Project Management Unit (PMU) of the Immovable Property Registration
System (IPRS) project and include data on attitudes and practices regarding women’s status and
intrahousehold property rights. In early 1995, the Independent Forum on Albanian Women
(IFAW) received funding from the PMU to interview husbands and wives in three districts
representing the three regions (north, central, and south) of Albania. Both husband and wife in
each household were interviewed; if the household head was widowed or the spouse unavailable,
another adult of the opposite sex in the household was interviewed. A total of 360 questionnaires
in 180 households were administered (120 individuals or 60 households in each district).
13 In late
1995, a baseline survey carried out by the PMU gathered data on numerous aspects of
agricultural land and property rights. This survey was implemented in 5 districts in the 3 regions
to 792 households. Only one person, the household head in the great majority of cases, was
interviewed.
1.6.1 Household head and property ownership rights
Concerning property rights in the household, the IFAW survey asked both husband and wife
who owns the land. A special effort was made to suggest that the answer could include more
than one person. The results, displayed in Table 1, indicate that the majority of respondents in all
three districts identify the head as the owner of family land.
The term owner was left undefined; therefore, it is difficult to know how respondents
interpreted its meaning. For instance, is it based on family-ownership norms, where the head is
the representative owner, or has there been a shift in attitudes such that the respondent believes
that the head as an individual has principal ownership rights to the property? Another
questionnaire item suggests that the head is a representative owner: when respondents were
asked if land is personal property, the majority, 93 percent, considered only jewelry and clothes
as personal belongings.
The results from both Table 1 and the question on personal property appear consistent when
viewed in the context of the traditional family structure: individuals see themselves as part of a
unit, their property rights being a function of that unit. The head of the household is considered
to be the owner in the sense that the head is responsible for representing the interests of the
family. However, if we consider that Albania is undergoing dramatic economic, social, and
demographic changes, particularly with the introduction of a market economy, this interpretation
may be misleading.
                                               
13 Data analysis of the IFAW survey was done by Rachel Wheeler; a more complete reporting of this survey, the
data, and its analysis can be found in Wheeler (1998).13
TABLE 1. Owner of land by region and by gender of respondent (%)
REGION AND GENDER OF RESPONDENT
PUKA (NORTH) LUSHNJA (CENTRAL) VLORA (SOUTH) ALL DISTRICTS
OWNER OF
LAND
(male) (female) (male) (female) (male) (female) (total)
Head of
household
91 80 97 95 96 98 93
Whole family 2 3 0 0 0 0 1
Other 7 17 3 5 2 2 6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
(n) (57) (59) (59) (59) (59) (60) (353)
Source: IFAW Intrahousehold Property Rights Survey, 1995.
Fieldwork and case evidence from the Appellate Court in the capital city of Tirana suggest
that in cases when the family structure becomes unstable due to divorce, family break-up, or
inheritance divisions, men typically claim sole, and individual, rights to the property. They do
this by appealing to selective attributes in the family ownership model, such as the centrality of
the male as a figure of authority and “formal” owner and the system of inheritance that is defined
only along the male line. In cases such as these, traditional norms that once related to families are
manipulated with the aim of denying women rights to family property and giving men more
individual rights than women.
14
TABLE 2. Gender of household head and of property titleholder by region
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD PROPERTY TITLEHOLDER
REGION Male Female Male Female
(n) (%) (n) (%) (n) (%) (n) (%)
Puka (north) 57 95 3 5 51 100 0 0
Lushnja (central) 59 98 1 2 38 100 0 0
Vlora (south) 59 98 1 2 24 100 0 0
Source: IFAW Intrahousehold Property Rights Survey, 1995.
The survey data strongly suggest that the patriarch is still an important pillar of rural
Albanian family life. Table 2 gives some indicators of this according to region. From 180
                                               
14 In these court cases, family members needed recourse to formal law. Since the survey interviewed only “stable”
families, the results may hold only in stable family situations, where ownership rights of individuals are only
hypothetical. If a sample were taken including couples going through divorce, the results may be different. Follow-up
studies should address this issue.14
households, 175 (97%) claimed to have a male head of household. Usually this person was the
oldest male in the family. In the 5 female-headed households, the women were widows. The
gender of the person whose name is specified on the property title deed (tapi) indicates who
represents the family in the public sphere; as Table 2 shows, 100 percent of the titles from the
113 households that actually possessed property titles specified only a male name, usually the
current head of the household.
The PMU survey conducted in late 1995 in rural communities of 5 districts shows similar
results. Out of 792 households, 52 percent (409 households) reported having received a title for
their farmland. Table 3 reveals that the great majority of the households are headed by men and
that most titleholders are also men, as heads of family.
TABLE 3. Gender of household head and property titleholder in 5 districts
HOUSEHOLD HEAD TITLEHOLDER
GENDER No. % No. %
Male 734 93.3 387 94.6
Female 53 6.7 22 5.4
Total 787 100 409 100
Source: PMU Baseline Survey, 1995.
The distribution of agricultural land in 1991 to village families, formalized with the Law on
Land (Law 7501), gave every family member equal rights to family land. However, only the
head of the family was specified on the property title. In itself, this does not present a problem,
since traditionally it is the head’s responsibility to act in the interests of the family. Fieldwork
prior to the surveys, however, showed that cases are emerging where the head has acted
irresponsibly and had either given away the land or sold it using the justification that he is the
legal owner as specified in the tapi. With this potential concern in mind, the IFAW survey
attempted to observe whether the respondents believed that the signature on the tapi gave that
person more rights to the land and property than the rest of the family members.
Data analysis (Table 4) shows that there is a significant difference between male and female
responses (significance level = 0.029) in the IFAW survey with regard to the titleholders’
property rights: women respondents are significantly more likely to state that the signature on the
tapi confers more rights to the signer than to other members of the family while male
respondents say that no extra rights are conferred upon the signer. This difference in perception
regarding equality of rights suggests that, in practice, women experience fewer rights to property
than men.15
TABLE 4. Belief regarding property rights of titleholder by region and by gender of
respondent (%)
REGION AND GENDER OF RESPONDENT
PUKA (NORTH) LUSHNJA (CENTRAL) VLORA (SOUTH) ALL DISTRICTS
RIGHTS OF
TITLEHOLDER
(male) (female) (male) (female) (male) (female) (total)
Has more rights 12 44 32 35 4 0 23
Does not have
more rights
88 56 68 65 96 100 77
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: IFAW Intrahousehold Property Rights Survey, 1995.
It is interesting to note the regional differences between men’s and women’s perceptions.
For instance, in Puka there is a vast difference between the male and female responses, with 44
percent of the women and only 12 percent of the men believing that the person specified on the
title deed has more rights, that is, rights relating to management and decision-making over that
property. By performing a two-sample difference between proportions test, we found the
difference between the responses of males and females in Puka to be significant (Zp = 2.945).
However, there is no significant difference between men’s and women’s responses in the other
districts. These differences across regions may be explained by the greater inequalities between
men and women in the northern as compared to the southern areas.
1.6.2 Inheritance rights
Formal legislation in Albania today provides men and women with equal property rights. The
emphasis on rights of individuals is implicit in the ownership and inheritance sections of the
Albanian Civil Code (1994). Fieldwork observations and findings from a set of focus group
meetings have shown, however, that many people ignore these legal provisions for equality of
rights. Traditional patrilineal norms regarding inheritance are so strong that demanding a share of
inheritance remains outside the reality of most rural people, particularly women. This is because
the family still acts very much as a unit, and property is seen to belong to that unit. Women
especially are unlikely to demand their rights as defined by law, not only for the reason already
mentioned but also because they do not see a need: they will marry and have access to the
husband’s family property. Field observations indicate that daughters take a passive role in
property acquisition by leaving their legal share of property to brothers; their opportunity to
acquire some rights to landed property, such as use rights, comes with marriage when they move
to their husband’s family home.
In addition, for those women or men who would potentially want to demand a share of
family property, lack of knowledge of supporting laws and procedures deters their making this
demand. Even if the law were known, many individuals would not demand their formal rights
since the traditional ramifications of doing so (such as expulsion from the village or family,
public shaming, or violence toward the demander) would outweigh the benefits of possessing
some property.16
The IFAW survey results demonstrate that the majority of rural people do not know the
content of the law regarding their legal rights to landed property. From the total respondents, 99
percent stated that they had no knowledge of formal law. Concerning attitudes with regard to
inheritance, results from the survey confirm the prevalence of traditional patrilineal inheritance
practices. Of the total respondents, 63 percent said that sons and 26 percent said that another
male relative would inherit the farm.
15
When disaggregated by region (Table 5), both male and female respondents in Puka have a
clear preference for sons to inherit while in the other two regions both sons and male relatives
comprise the great majority of preferred heirs. Daughters are seldom considered heirs.
TABLE 5. Heir preference (%) by region and by gender of respondent
REGION AND GENDER OF RESPONDENT
PUKA (NORTH) LUSHNJA (CENTRAL) VLORA (SOUTH) ALL DISTRICTS
HEIR
PREFERENCE
(male) (female) (male) (female) (male) (female) (total)
Sons 83 80 46 39 67 62 63
Daughters 12 14 5 7 5 5 8
Male relatives 3 6 39 46 28 33 26
Other 2 0 10 8 1 0 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: IFAW Intrahousehold Property Rights Survey, 1995.
To further explore these preferences, the sample was split according to whether the families
had only daughters (19 families, 10.5%) or only sons (42 families, 23.3%). The incidence of
families with only daughters was low; therefore, the extent of statistical analysis that could be
performed was limited. The frequencies, however, from this group and an analysis of their
family structures prove highly interesting. Simple frequency calculations show that of the total
respondents (38 respondents in 19 “only daughter” families), 15 (39%) said that when both
parents died they would give the land to male relatives, and 23 (61%) said they would give it to
their daughters. This shows a clear shift in attitude from the traditional system where, if a family
had only daughters, they would give the land to male relatives. Further analysis shows that the 15
(39%) respondents who said that they would give the land to male relatives had almost identical
family structures: all except one were composed of two generations where the parents were
relatively young and their children were all below age 16. This suggests that parents would leave
the property to male relatives as guardians until the daughters are old enough to take
responsibility for the farm. There appears to be some indication, then, that discrimination against
daughters is not as strong as customary law would suggest, particularly in families with no sons.
                                               
15 The survey question was: “Who will inherit the farm after the death of both parents?”17
When the group of 42 families with only sons
16 was analyzed, 19 percent of the respondents
(16 persons out of 84) said that on the death of both parents they would give the farmland to
male relatives. Although this is a small number, it nonetheless appears curious given traditional
customs of male (sons’) inheritance. But, again looking at the family structures of these cases,
they were predominantly composed of two-generation families where the sons were very young.
In a couple of cases, adult sons had migrated.
Although the results of this analysis suggest some change in the inheritance practices of
families, when a family has both sons and daughters, traditional inheritance practices prevail and
sons, not daughters, have the right to inherit. In families with only daughters, however, the
daughters, rather than a male relative, are likely to inherit. This could be indicative of a general
concern with keeping property within the immediate nuclear family rather than allowing the
extended family to assume those rights.
An interesting variation in regional attitudes with regard to equal inheritance rights between
sons and daughters was found in the IFAW survey (see Table 6). For the sample as a whole, a
significant difference (chi-sq. = 9.229, significance level = 0.0024) between male and female
responses was found: a higher percentage of female respondents believe sons and daughters
should have equal rights. Cross-tabulations by district, however, suggest that the significant
difference comes from Puka alone.
TABLE 6. Inheritance rights of sons and daughters by region and by gender of respondent
REGION AND GENDER OF RESPONDENT




RIGHTS (% male) (% female) (% male) (% female) (% male) (% female)
Equal rights 39 86 29 27 22 23
Unequal rights 61 14 71 73 78 77
Chi-square and
significance 28.816; 0.000 (DF=2) 0.0421; 0.837 (DF=2) 1.0397; 0.595 (DF=2)
Source: IFAW Intrahousehold Property Rights Survey, 1995.
The observed significance levels suggest that in Puka attitudes regarding equal inheritance
rights are dependent on the gender of the respondent, while in Vlora and Lushnja responses to
the question are independent of gender. Performing a two-sample difference of proportions test
for female respondents and taking “yes” answers as the focus category, there is a significant
difference between female responses in Puka and female responses in other regions: (z/p = 7.97,
p = 0.00000). Also analyzing male and female responses in Puka alone and focusing on the “yes”
category, we find a significant difference (z/p = 3.407, p = 0.0000).
These results seems to contradict what one would expect given the strong traditional norms
of the north. For instance, one would expect that due to strong patriarchy in this region, both
                                               
16 The general preference for sons is hinted at by the number of families with only sons (42) as compared to those
with only daughters (19). It is not uncommon for a mother to bear children until a son is born.18
women and men would prefer to leave property to sons. One explanation of this apparent
anomaly may come from the different levels of autonomy that women have in different regions.
For instance, 45 percent of women respondents in Puka said that the person who is named on the
title has different rights than the rest of the family, whereas in the southern districts the name on
the title did not imply different rights. This difference in the autonomy of women in different
regions may explain why women in the north express a desire for equality in inheritance for their
sons and daughters—as a way to counterbalance wives’ lack of autonomy with respect to
husbands. An alternative explanation may be that women in the north experience greater
vulnerability than those in the rest of Albania when the men in the household emigrate to find
employment in the cities.
The PMU survey (in five districts) also asked household heads
17 their opinion regarding
who in the family should inherit the land. Table 7 gives the results by district. Results shown
confirm that there is a strong preference, particularly in the north, for bequeathing land to male
relatives; only 13 percent preferred to have all family members inherit the land.















Youngest child 2.2 2 2.8 9 5.3 30 4%
Eldest child 2.2 0.4 2 0 0.8 8 1%
Males 91 67.5 83.2 74 80.5 613 77.5%
All members 3.3 18.5 12 13.5 7.5 99 12.5%
By law 1 11.5 0 3.6 6 41 5%
Total no. 90 243 214 111 133 791 100%
Source: PMU Baseline Survey, 1995.
1.6.3 Marriage and property rights
Traditionally, when daughters marry, they leave their family home and their rights to the family
farm. The IFAW survey results in Table 8 regarding a married daughter’s rights to her birth
family property indicate that people still hold with this tradition: the majority of respondents
(77%) claimed that married daughters are not entitled to family property. Not one respondent
from Puka, male or female, thought that women are entitled to some family property upon
marriage. Lushnja displayed more positive responses than the other districts with regard to
married daughters’ entitlement to family land.
                                               
17 Respondents in the IPRS survey are overwhelmingly male (94%).19
TABLE 8. Daughters’ rights to birth family property upon marriage
by region and by gender of respondent
REGION AND GENDER OF RESPONDENT
PUKA (NORTH) LUSHNJA (CENTRAL) VLORA (SOUTH)
DAUGHTERS’
RIGHTS
(% male) (% female) (% male) (% female) (% male) (% female)
TOTAL
Entitled 0 0 29 25 15 12 13
Not entitled 100 100 71 75 85 88 77
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: IFAW Intrahousehold Property Rights Survey, 1995.
The PMU survey contains information on the practice of allocation of farmland to family
members at the time they marry and set up a separate household. While the number of these
subdivisions of family land is not numerous, it does suggest that practice conforms to the
attitudes reflected above. Table 9 provides frequencies on the number of marriages and
subdivisions that occurred in the PMU sample households between 1991 and 1995.
TABLE 9. Marriages and land subdivisions since 1991, by district
LAND SUBDIVISIONS AS RESULT OF MARRIAGE DISTRICT (REGION) MARRIAGES
Son Daughter Other member
Kukes (north) 24 0 0 1
Lushnja (central) 91 10 1 0
Tirana (central) 101 11 0 4
Gjirokaster (south) 30 0 0 0
Korça (south) 48 4 1 0
Total 294 25 2 5
Source: PMU Baseline Survey, 1995.
From a total 294 marriages, there had been only 32 land subdivisions, 25 of which were due
to marriage of a son. Only two land subdivisions were made when daughters married. These
findings support the thesis that the traditional practice of daughters moving away from their birth
home and not being entitled to their birth family’s land is still prevalent. These findings support
the observation that a person’s rights to birth family land continue to be dependent on traditional
marriage practices which in turn are governed by gender.
While the distribution across districts is thin (because there were so few subdivisions), Table
9 suggests that rural families in Gjirokaster and Kukes are not subdividing land when their
children marry while, in the other districts, subdivision because of marriage occurs more
frequently (between 10% and 15%). The small landholding size in Kukes and Gjirokaster and the20
low level of farm activity, together with high out-migration, may explain why subdivision is not
common.
TABLE 10. Wife’s right as equal owner to family land, by region and gender of respondent
REGION AND GENDER OF RESPONDENT
PUKA (NORTH) LUSHNJA (CENTRAL) VLORA (SOUTH)
WIFE HAS
RIGHT AS
EQUAL OWNER (% male) (% female) (% male) (% female) (% male) (% female)
TOTAL
Yes 100 97 76 81 93 65 85
No 0 3 24 9 7 35 15
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: IFAW Intrahousehold Property Rights Survey, 1995.
IFAW survey results on beliefs concerning a wife’s right to her husband’s land support the
cultural norm that a woman’s rights to landed property is through her relation to either husband
or father. Within a family ownership model she has some access rights to property, but not full
ownership rights. While Table 8 showed that all the respondents from Puka did not allow the
daughter to take family land, Table 10 shows that the majority of respondents believe that she
becomes an equal owner of her husband’s family land. In this sense, the family model appears to
recognize and protect a wife’s rights to family land.
1.6.4 Decision-making authority over property rights
Ownership rights include the rights to sell, rent out, bequeath, use as collateral, determine use,
and construct buildings, among others. Respondents of the PMU survey were asked who in the
family has decision-making authority over these rights.
18 As the results on inheritance and land
subdivision have suggested, the head of household (over other family members) has exclusive
right to make decisions with regard to land and its use. There is some variation between regions,
however. The proportion of respondents in Kukes that gave decision-making power with regard
to all these rights to the household head was consistently higher (between 65% and 70%)
compared to other districts. Taking two property rights as examples, the rights to sell and to
determine use, illustrates these regional differences. The right to sell is a very different
ownership right from the right to determine use: the former is a one-time, permanent decision
while the latter is periodic and temporary and does not imply loss of the land.
How are these rights distributed among family members across districts and within districts?
Table 11 reveals that across districts, the household head has the strongest rights (except in
Lushnja), particularly in Kukes and Gjirokaster, while husband and wife were most frequently
mentioned in the southern districts, Korça and Gjirokaster. The rights of all family members are
strongest in the central region districts, Lushnja and Tirana. Percentage differences between the
                                               
18 The question asked: “Who in the family has the right to decide: (1) sale of land, (2) rental of land, (3) bequeathal of
land, (4) using land as collateral, (5) use of land, and (6) building on land?”21
two rights are evident in some districts such as Gjirokaster where the household head decides on
how to use the land, but both husband and wife decide on sale transactions.













Sell Use Sell Use Sell Use Sell Use Sell Use SELL USE
Head 66 70 39 40 44 41 43 66 31 46 43 48
Head and
spouse
10 9 19 11 11 13 50 25 38 21 21 15
Sons 2 2 0.5 0.5 6 7 1 5 2 3 2 3
Daughters 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Whole
family
19 17 51 49 39 39 5 4 29 30 34 33
Family and
kin
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.1 0
Region
tradition
2 2 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.3
Source: PMU Baseline Survey, 1995.
Within districts, rights to decide on sale and use of family land in Korça are most evenly
distributed among household head, husband and spouse, and the whole family. In Kukes, by
contrast, the household head holds these rights to the exclusion of most other members. In Tirana
and Lushnja, the household head shares these rights with the whole family. And in Gjirokaster,
either household head or husband and wife exercise these rights.
1.7 CONCLUSIONS
Thus far, the data available to us show that customary attitudes and practices with regard to
landed property prevail, though with regional variations. Land is considered family land (i.e.,
belonging to the family), administered by the household head (who in Albania is generally the
husband or oldest male person), and passed down from one generation to another through the
male bloodline. The data also indicate that women, as either daughters or wives, have access
rights to use, live on, and work the land, but generally do not have control rights (e.g., right to
sell or inherit) to family land. Most of the data available, however, refer to persons’ attitudes and
beliefs regarding property rights. And as we saw, some of the data appear to be contradictory or
ambiguous.
What is lacking at this point is an information base on what people are actually doing with
regard to land and property rights: Are family farms being conserved as whole units or are they
being fragmented among heirs or even sold? Are daughters and wives inheriting rights to land; if
so, what kind of rights are they inheriting? How is land inherited by absent sons being22
administered? Are there conflicts regarding property rights within families? Are the regional
differences that emerge from the data we have due to the local customary differences or to the
socioeconomic differences that the country is undergoing?
Case studies that permit a deeper scrutiny of these issues are needed to answer these and
other questions so that policy and programmatic recommendations can be made to: (1) resolve
some of the contradictions and conflicts that currently exist in the legislation; (2) determine if
new legislation and norms for verifying and transferring property rights are needed; and (3)
design education and outreach programs on property rights, property transactions, and
registration of transactions.
The next section uses the PMU survey data to look at the differences between farms
managed by men and those managed by women in an attempt to glean some insight into whether
differentiated property rights have an impact on farm management. The working thesis is that
customary bias against women’s owning landed property affects production on the family farm,
particularly when female farmers’ property rights are neither clear nor secure.
2. GENDER AND MANAGEMENT OF FAMILY FARMS
This section explores one aspect of the potential conflict between customary landownership and
individual property rights within the context of agricultural production in a market economy.
Given that agricultural production within a market economy involves transactions such as credit
and investment, which are based on property rights, and that customary tenure in Albania places
the control of landed property in the hands of selected men, do family farms managed by women
operate under different conditions than those managed by men? More specifically, do female
managers have the same access to production factors (land, credit, labor) as male managers? Are
female-managed farms as market oriented as male-managed farms? Do women farmers have the
same level of tenure security as men farmers? Do family farm enterprises managed by women
face constraints different from those managed by men? The issue of women farmers and the
particular problems they may face is valid since women manage a significant number of family
farms in Albania. As family members migrate or search for off-farm work and leave the farm
operation to women, the problems that women face as owners and farm managers become of
greater concern.
The PMU baseline survey data do not permit a satisfactory exploration of these questions
since women farm managers were not identified or interviewed; therefore, the answers to these
questions will, of necessity, be inferred. The overwhelming majority of the survey respondents
were men (94%); only 48 (6%) of the nearly 800 respondents were women. Consequently, very
few women managers were able to provide their answers on different issues such as agricultural
input availability, constraints, labor allocation on farm, and tenure security.
A summary look at the employment sectors (Table 12) in which family members of the
PMU baseline survey work shows that 39 percent work on the farm. Division of work by gender
in rural Albania is by task and product; most family members engage in agricultural work, but
women are more likely to be responsible for farm processing, subsistence crops, and dairy
production while men work mainly with cash crops, land clearance, and irrigation.23
TABLE 12. Employment categories for all household members
EMPLOYMENT SECTOR NUMBER PERCENT
Agriculture 1,550 38.9
(On-farm all year) (1,273) (32.0)
(On-farm 6 months a year) (132) (3.3)
(On-farm 3 months a year) (145) (3.6)
Off-farm private sector 100 2.5





Minor (under age 6) 538 13.5
Soldier 38 1.0
Total 4,022 100.0
Missing data = 40.
Source: PMU Baseline Survey, 1995.
The relevance of work to intrafamily property rights may have legal implications: officials
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Justice, and the PMU  have been discussing  a
definition of the farm family for purposes of land transactions procedures,
19 for credit collateral
policy, and for the creation of a new family code. Some of the debate has stressed that a
definition of a farm family must incorporate “those individuals who are dependent on the land
for a means of economic survival.” If this kind of definition is used, it will be interesting to
observe whether those family members who participate in and depend on agricultural activities
are able to protect their legal rights on this basis. In other words, involvement in farm activities
may provide some family member with greater ownership rights to landed property.
Albanian women have always been involved in farm work, including much of the hard,
manual field work. Women’s participation rate in the agricultural labor force in state farms and
collectives increased during the 1960s and 1970s, eventually surpassing men’s participation rate
by 1981 (Sjöberg 1991, p. 117). Currently, wives, daughters, mothers, and daughters-in-law
work on the family farm. In the  PMU  sample, women make up 49 percent of household
members and similarly account for about half of the labor force on the family farms: of the 1,273
persons who work all year on the farm, 51 percent are women, and 52 percent of the 277 persons
who work only part of the year on the farm are women.
Disaggregating the employment information by gender and family position (Tables 13 and
14), we can make some generalizations regarding who is involved in farm activities.  A
comparison of male heads of household (husbands) and female spouses (wives) shows that more
wives (50%) work as full-time farmers than husbands (44%), and that four times more husbands
(17%) work off the farm than wives (4%).
                                               
19 That is, a definition that works within the context of the Buying and Selling of Agricultural Land Law.24
TABLE 13. Employment categories of husbands and wives
HUSBANDS WIVES EMPLOYMENT SECTOR
Number Percent Number Percent
On-farm all year 323 44 352 50
On-farm part of the year 58 8 51 7
Off-farm all year 121 17 29 4
Emigrant 11 2 0 0
Retired 210 29 131 19
Housewife 1 0.1 129 18
Missing data 10 1.5 9 1.3
Total 734 100 701 100
Source: PMU Baseline Survey, 1995.
TABLE 14. Employment categories of sons, daughters, and daughters-in-law
(between ages 15 and 60)
SONS DAUGHTERS DAUGHTERS-IN-LAW EMPLOYMENT SECTOR
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent
On-farm all year 266 43 134 48 111 58
On-farm part of year 69 11 59 21 18 9
Off-farm all year 77 12 7 3 11 6
Student 73 12 45 16 0 0
Emigrant 64 10 2 0.7 14 7
Retired 3 0.5 0 0 2 1
Housewife 0 0 27 10 36 19
Minor 2 0.3 1 0.4 0 0
Soldier 33 5 0 0 0 0
Missing 32 5 3 1 1 0.5
Total 619 100 278 100 193 100
Source: PMU Baseline Survey, 1995.
Table 14 further demonstrates that, proportionately, more women than men in the sample
households work on  their  family farms. While 48 percent of daughters and 58 percent of
daughters-in-law  also  work on the farm, only 43 percent of sons do. Conversely, a larger
proportion of sons work off the farm, have emigrated, or are soldiers.
20 What becomes very
                                               
20 Although the number is probably very small, the survey data did not specifically code sons-in-law living in the
household.25
evident is the valuable contribution both daughters and daughters-in-law make to the family farm
labor force.
2.1 INCIDENCE AND TITLE STATUS OF FEMALE-MANAGED FARMS
While the great majority (93%) of the households in the sample are headed by men,
21 only 45
percent of these male household heads are full-time farmers. The other farms are managed by
either another male family member such as the eldest son or by the head’s wife, daughter,
daughter-in-law, or mother. Thus, most of the female-managed farm households have men as the
culturally recognized household heads.
For purposes of this analysis, we classified the 792 families according to the gender of the
farm enterprise manager. Since the PMU survey did not identify who in the household manages
the farm, we used the amount of labor allocated to the farm to determine the person most likely
to be managing the farm enterprise day-to-day, particularly crop production. This breakdown
22
resulted in 165 (21%) female-managed and 629 (79%) male-managed farms. The distribution of
these households across districts is significantly uneven: as the column percentages in Table 15
show, the highest incidence of female-managed farms is in Tirana (28.5%) and Kukes (24.7%)
districts, and the lowest incidence is in Lushnja district (14.3%).













No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % NO. %
Male
manager
67 75.3 209 85.7 153 71.5 89 79.5 109 82.0 627 79.2
Female
manager
22 24.7 35 14.3 61 28.5 23 20.5 24 18.0 165 20.8
Total 89 11.2 244 30.7 214 27.0 112 14.1 133 16.8 792 100.0
Pearson Chi-square value: 15.86749; DF: 5; significance level: 0.00723.
Source: PMU Baseline Survey, 1995.
                                               
21 There are only 53 (6.6%) female-headed households in the entire sample, which is consistent with Albanian
practice of a son’s assuming family authority when the father dies. The majority (60%) of the female heads are over
60 years old and 81 percent are widowed. Only 11 of them (17%) work on the farm and the majority (72%) are
retired.
22 The breakdown was done by assuming that the person who works full-time on the farm is the manager. If both a
man and a woman in a family work full-time on the farm, it was assumed that the man was the manager. If no one
worked full-time, then the person who worked the most time on the farm was coded the manager, always assuming
that if both a man and a woman in a household work the same amount of time, the man is the manager.26
Explanations for these differences among districts is suggested by their different agricultural
and economic situations. Agriculture is strong in Lushnja: most of the land is on a fertile plain
with extensive irrigation infrastructure, and the per capita allotment of land per household during
the distribution program was considerably higher (4.1 dynum) than in the other districts (which
ranged from 0.4 dynum in Kukes to 2.6 dynum in Korça). There would be good reasons in
Lushnja, therefore, for the family to exploit the holding intensively, investing much family labor
in the farm enterprise. Tirana District, on the other hand, while also having good soils and
irrigation, contains the capital  (and largest) city  of Albania, which offers off-farm work
(temporary and permanent) to people from the surrounding villages. Since it is generally men
who migrate in search of work, women are often left in charge of the farm. In Kukes, farm
holdings are tiny and the land is mountainous. In addition, families in Kukes have experienced a
permanent loss of their members, particularly adult children, to migration (mostly to cities within
Albania) as they look for work opportunities.
With regard to title documentation from the land distribution program, 88 of the 165
households in the subsample of farms managed by women had received a tapi for their land. As
Table 16 shows, 6 of these 88 households are headed by women; thus the farm manager and the
tapi holder are one and the same person. In all the other households, the tapi are in the name of
the male household head or another male relative. In these female-managed farm households, the
male head (154 out of 165 households) is either retired (38%), has a government job (29%), or
works off the farm for a private enterprise (16%). A small number (4%) have emigrated. In most
farms managed by women, consequently, the person responsible for agricultural production is
not named on the title document. This may impact negatively on women farmers’ ability to
engage in market activities such as credit, investment in farm improvements, and land
transactions (leasing, sales).
TABLE 16. Titleholder in female-managed farms
by family position and gender
HEAD SPOUSE FATHER SON TOTAL
Male 74 1 2 1 78 (92.9%)
Female 6 0 0 0 6 (7.1%)
Total N 80 1 2 1 84
Percent 95.2 1.2 2.4 1.2 100%
Source: PMU Baseline Survey, 1995.
2.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FEMALE- AND MALE-MANAGED FARMS
This analysis begins with differences in household composition between female-managed and
male-managed farms and continues by looking at different aspects of agricultural production,
investment, household labor allocation, and decision-making power. As Table 17 suggests, the
structure of both types of household is similar with regard to overall size and age structure. There27
are no significant differences in the mean household size and in the mean number of children
(between 0 and 20 years of age) between female-managed and male-managed farm households.
Neither is the dependency ratio (number of persons younger than 15 or older than 60 relative to
the number of working-age persons aged 15 to 60) significantly different.





Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Household size 5.0 1.81 5.1 2.11
No. of children 2.2 1.55 2.1 1.59
Dependency ratio 1.02 0.93 1.08 0.99
No. of adult women 1.8 1.01 1.7 0.91
No. of adult men 1.7 0.95 1.8 1.08
Gender ratio 1.25* 0.95 1.07* 0.59
*Analysis of variance shows significant difference at 0.01 level.
Source: PMU Baseline Survey, 1995.
The gender structure of the households would also appear to be the same for both types of
household: the mean numbers of adult men and of adult women  per household  are not
significantly different. The gender ratio (adult women to adult men within a household),
however, is significantly higher for female-managed farm households, suggesting that the farm
operation may depend more on female labor on female-managed farms than on male-managed
ones.
Comparison of the farm operations of female-managed and male-managed farms shows that
there are also significant differences with regard to farm size and level of fragmentation (see
Table 18). The average size of holding for male-managed farms is 2 dynum larger than female-
managed farms, a highly significant difference. This difference is most likely explained by the
fact that in those districts where the proportion of female-managed farms is highest (Tirana and
Kukes), the mean size of farm holding is much smaller than in the other districts: between 0.3
and 0.6 hectare as compared to 1.0–1.7 hectares. Male-managed farms are also more fragmented.
Allocation of family labor to the farm operation also differs significantly between the two
groups. While both types of household have almost the same number of persons between the
ages of 15 and 60 (defined as the available family labor force), the number of persons allocated
to work on the farm is smaller on female-managed farms. Not only are there fewer full-time farm
laborers on female-managed farms, the ratio of total family labor working on the farm to that of
available family labor is also significantly smaller. In 45 percent of these households, women
managers work the farm without the help of other household members. Very few farms,
including female-managed farms, had hired help on the farm.28
TABLE 18. Farm characteristics of female-managed and male-managed farms
FEMALE-MANAGED FARMS MALE-MANAGED FARMS FARM CHARACTERISTICS
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Size of holding 9.2* 7.52 11.3* 9.03
Number of parcels 4.1* 2.08 4.6* 2.21
Available family labor 3.2 1.49 3.3 1.66
No. of full-time farmers 1.2* 0.99 1.7* 1.54
Total family farm labor 1.3* 0.92 1.8* 1.47
Farm labor ratio 0.45* 0.24 0.57* 0.38
*Analysis of variance shows significant difference at 0.01 level.
Source: PMU Baseline Survey, 1995.
2.2.1 Farm enterprise type
What types of farm enterprise are these women managing? As with male-managed farms,
agricultural production is mostly for home consumption; relatively few households reported
selling any of their production. However, as Table 19 shows, the proportion of male-managed
farms selling some of their crop production is significantly higher. For livestock and tree
production, cross-tabulation shows no significant difference: very few of both types of farm sold
any of their products. One can conclude that male-managed farms are more likely to market
agricultural products, particularly crops, than female-managed farms.
TABLE 19. Production destination in female-managed and male-managed farms
FEMALE-MANAGED MALE MANAGED
TYPE OF FARM % home % market % home % market P. CHI-SQ. SIG.
Crop production 76 24 68 32 3.93 0.05
Livestock products 81 19 76 24 1.83 0.18
Livestock Production 57 43 57 43 0.00 0.99
Tree products 97 3 97 3 0.01 0.92
Source: PMU Baseline Survey, 1995.
2.2.2 Source of household income
Related to the question of agricultural sales is income source for these rural households. Table 20
shows that crop production is the main source of income for a higher percentage (53% versus
32%) of male-managed farm households. This, however, does not mean that land is underutilized
in female-managed farms: in both types of household, only 8 percent are leaving any of their
parcels uncultivated. Thus, while it appears that gender of farm manager does not affect whether29
land is being worked, agricultural production on farms managed by men is more likely to find its
way to the market than from female-managed farms.















N= 52 8 39 31 5 26 4 165 Female-
managed % 31.5 4.8 23.6 18.8 3.0 15.8 2.4 20.8
N= 331 72 48 23 37 113 3 627 Male-
managed % 52.8 11.5 7.7 3.7 5.9 18.0 0.5 79.2
N= 383 80 87 54 42 139 7 792 Total
% 48.4 10.1 11.0 6.8 5.3 17.6 0.9 100
Chi-square = 100.09; significance level < 0.0001.
Source: PMU Baseline Survey, 1995.
An interesting question would be why women farmers place less of their production on the
market. Do women encounter problems placing their products on the market? Or do they not
need to sell their production because cash income is forthcoming from other sources? Off-farm
income (government and private sector employment) is the main income source for 44 percent of
female-managed farm households but for only 11 percent of male-managed farm households,
suggesting that off-farm income is a significant factor. The survey data do not permit
examination of market constraints.
2.2.3 Investments and constraints in agricultural production
Are levels of farm investment different in female-managed and male-managed farms? Do
female-managed farms face constraints different from those managed by men. On the issue of
investment, the survey inquired about different types of investment since 1991 in the farm
operation such as purchasing a tractor or other farm machinery, buying farm animals, planting
fruit trees, and constructing farm buildings.
23 Only 17 percent of all sample households had
made any farm investments, with no significant difference between female- and male-managed
farms in this respect (see Table 21).
                                               
23 Positive answers to these questions were simply coded 1 and then added to yield a number for each household that
reflects the number of farm investments they had made since 1991; this process yielded values that ranged from 0 to
3.30
TABLE 21. Agricultural investment and constraint indices in female-managed
and male-managed family farms





Fragmentation 0.15** 0.07** 0.09
Input prices 0.15** 0.26** 0.23
*Each constraint is coded: no = 0, yes = 1.
**Analysis of variance shows significant difference at 0.01 level.
Source: PMU Baseline Survey, 1995.
Credit availability may be one reason for these low investment levels: only 11 percent of the
households had applied to a bank for credit after 1991, and only about a third of these actually
obtained a loan. Once again, there was little difference between female-managed and male-
managed farm households.
24
In addition to lack of credit, farmers in Albania face many other constraints: over 90 percent
of all the farms encountered difficulties in farming. The most often cited constraints are: too little
land, fragmentation of holding, water shortage, high input prices, and lack of tractors. While in
response to most constraints there is little difference between female-managed and male-
managed farms, some responses are significantly different. As Table 21 reveals, female-managed
households cited fragmentation to be a constraint significantly more often than male-managed
farms, while male-managed farms were more likely to cite high input prices as a constraint. The
latter is consistent with the previous finding that male-managed farms are more market oriented,
while female-managed farms produce more for family consumption.
The problem of fragmentation is more difficult to explain, particularly since male-managed
farm holdings are significantly more fragmented than female-managed farm holdings (see Table
18). This may indicate that women find managing fragmented holdings more problematic—if
they are also responsible for household maintenance and reproduction, farming on multiple
parcels, particularly if they are located far from the house, may account for a greater tendency to
consider fragmentation a problem. It should also be recalled that female-managed farms have
significantly less family labor allocated to farming, further decreasing the time available for
farming scattered parcels.
2.3 CONCLUSIONS
This section has shown that a significant proportion of farms are managed by women (21%) and
that almost all of these women do not hold title to the land they are working. These farms are
smaller and have a significantly lower proportion of family labor allocated to farming. The data
                                               
24 If one relates gender of respondent (not farm manager) to credit, none of the female respondents who applied for
loans was successful, while a third of males respondents who applied received formal credit.31
analysis also demonstrates that farms managed by women are less likely to engage in cash-
cropping and face different farming constraints than those managed by men, and that these
households derive most of their income from off-farm sources.
What is not clear is whether family farms managed by women are different because women
do not have clear property rights and therefore are constrained in commercial production, or
whether these farms are considered of secondary importance within the household’s income-
generation scheme and therefore are of marginal interest. The fact that extremely few women
were interviewed makes reaching any conclusions difficult. As concluded in the first section of
this paper further studies need to be done, case studies that interview women within the context
of their lives, as both daughters and wives, farmers and housewives, land users and property
holders.
In the next section, the status and rights of ethnic minorities are discussed to examine the
potential impact of ethnicity on property rights and to determine the risk of ethnic conflict such
as has been experienced in other Balkan states.
3. ETHNIC CLEAVAGES IN CONTEMPORARY ALBANIA
Contemporary Albania presents an interesting example of how the transition from a closed
communist regime to a more democratic open society brings a mixture of old and new political,
social, and ethnic cleavages into prominence.
25 This section focuses primarily on ethnic
cleavages that have come to light since the collapse of the communist system. The analysis
involves a review of the limited literature addressing the origins and settlement patterns of the
Albanian people and the migration and settlement patterns of other ethnic minorities residing
within the country. The national minorities are small as a proportion of the Albanian population;
however, they are diverse in origin and culture.
Research on ethnic issues facing contemporary Albania is sparse and much of it is based on
limited fieldwork observations or single case studies. Any attempt to generalize the results is
severely restricted. We can, however, utilize the existing research to highlight basic trends. We
define the term “ethnic” as a set of sociocultural characteristics that distinguish one group from
another. Although it is acknowledged that the origins of differentiation between particular groups
may be racial and biological, a more informative analysis of the differences in contemporary
Albania focuses on cultural differences. A general finding of the current research indicates that in
contrast to many other contemporary Balkan states, such as the former republics of Yugoslavia,
Albania is relatively homogeneous ethnically and there appears to be no major concern regarding
potential ethnic conflict (Miall 1995).
A commonly cited social cleavage within the dominant ethnic Albanian population stems
from a linguistic and cultural differentiation between ethnic Albanians living in the North and
South of the country. Nowadays this distinction is exacerbated by political interests (Vickers and
Pettifer 1997). Of these ethnic groups, the Greeks have been and are likely to continue to be the
only minority in Albania large enough to have any substantial political, economic, and social
                                               
25 For a detailed analysis of cleavage theory in contemporary Eastern Europe, see Kitschelt (1992) and Von Beyme
(1996). Hugh Miall (1995) applies cleavage theory directly to contemporary Albania.32
influence. This potential ethnic tension is heightened by the southern location of the majority of
the Albanian Greeks, close to the neighboring Greek state, which has in the past claimed part of
the territory they occupy. However, as discussed below, this potential influence continues to be
restrained by the lack of attention provided to ethnic minorities in current Albanian governance.
Apart from Greeks, the ethnic minorities in Albania include the Vlachs, Slav-speaking
groups (Macedonians, Serbs, Montegrins), Gypsies, Armenians, Jews, and the Cham.
26 The
minorities’ historical settlement patterns and their position in contemporary, post-communist
Albania is also described. Some consideration of the ethnic minorities’ status under communism
is necessary to fully understand their positions in present-day Albania.
3.1 ETHNIC ALBANIANS OUTSIDE ALBANIA
The issues of ethnic identity, nationalism, and social and geographical mobility of ethnic
Albanians living outside of the Albanian state are not discussed in detail. This is a subject that is
attracting ever-increasing attention, particularly with regard to Kosova and Greece.
In 1992, Albania had a population of about 3.4 million, and it estimated that in 2000, this
will be 3.9 million.
27 It is also estimated that an additional 3 million Albanians live outside of the
country,
28 in Italy, Greece, Turkey, and the United States, and especially in the former republics
and provinces of ex-Yugoslavia, such as Kosova, Macedonia, and Montenegro. In the early
1980s, it was estimated that about 8 percent of the Yugoslav population was comprised of
Albanians, 70 percent of whom resided in Kosova (a province of Serbia). Historically Kosova
has experienced marginalization from Serbian society and has become the Balkan “flashpoint” of
1998.
Ethnic pressures also mark Albania’s relations with the former Yugoslav republic of
Macedonia, where Albanians make up the biggest and most vociferous minority, accounting for
23 percent of the state’s 2.1 million population.
29 A recent article states that “in the turbulence
that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia, the large ethnic Albanian populations in Serbia and
here [FYROM] are viewed by governments and political analysts as time bombs waiting to
explode” (New York Times, 5 May 1997).
30 The flood of illegal Albanian emigrants into Italy
and Greece have also caused concern and unrest within the recipient countries. “The massive
influx of thousands of illegal Albanian economic migrants into Greece has contributed to the
rising crime rate and reinforced negative attitudes toward Albania among the Greek public.”
31
Although ethnic issues within Albania are not causes for immediate concern, it should be
remembered that nearly half the ethnic Albanian population resides outside of Albania, and as a
                                               
26 The Chams comprise an Albanian-speaking minority in Greece, which the Greek government does not recognize.
The Chams (those expelled from Greece after World War II) still have their claims on their lands in Greece and this
is likely to remain an issue in Greek-Albanian relations.
27 See tables, in Vickers and Pettifer (1997), from the Directorate of Statistics in Tirana.
28 Financial Times, Country review, 2 October 1995.
29 See Financial Times, 2 October 1995.
30 FYROM is the acronym for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
31 The Independent, 30 June 1993.33
small central-Balkan country Albania is very sensitive to external developments, which are
essentially beyond its control, but which could sharply affect the internal situation at any time.
32
3.2 HISTORY OF THE ALBANIAN PEOPLE AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS
The Encyclopedia of World Cultures (1992) identifies the name “Albanian” as deriving from the
ancient town of Albanopolis, mentioned by Ptolemy in the second century B.C. and located
within present-day Albania. “Illyrian” is the name for the population that lived partly on modern
Albanian territory from the time of the Iron Age; it is sometimes used in Albanian literature as a
designation for “ancestral Albanians.” Shiqptare, meaning “sons of the eagle,” originally the
self-designation of the northern highlands only, is the modern Albanian ethnonym for all
Albanian people. Similarly the word Shiqperia is used by Albanians to refer to their country
whereas the rest of the world uses the word “Albania.”
Archaeological and prehistoric evidence for Illyrian settlements on Albanian territory dates
from the second millenium B.C.
33 After 168 B.C., Illyria belonged to the Roman Empire. From
the fourth to the sixth centuries the Illyrians suffered Hun and Gothic invasions, and from the
sixth century Slavs began to settle on Illyrian territory. In Kosova the plains settlers withdrew
into the mountains, thus laying the historical foundations for the present-day territorial disputes
between the Serbs and the Albanians in ex-Yugoslavia. From 750 A.D., the area was under
Byzantine rule, and from 851 to 1014, it belonged to the Bulgarian Empire. Before becoming
part of the Great Serbian Empire in 1334, the region was subjected to the Normans and the
Neopolitans. At the end of the fifteenth century, the Ottoman Empire absorbed the territory for
about four and a half centuries. Finally, in 1912, Albania declared its independence in
conjunction with an agreement reached among the western powers to recognize Albanian
sovereignty. This independence was short-lived; the French, Italians, and Germans fought over
the area during the two world wars. In 1946, Albania was declared the People’s Socialist
Republic under the National Liberation Front headed by Enver Hoxha.
Coon (1950) presents an interesting ethnographic account of the racial and cultural
characteristics of the Northern Albanian Ghegs. Like the account given above, Coon
hypothesizes that except for the lowlands along the coast, the tribal area was probably
uninhabited, or nearly so, until the second half of the first millenium B.C. Illiyrians moved down
from the northwest, following the mountains, and settled. However, Coon also believes that
some Thracians may have entered from the east, and a few Goths straggled into the country
around the source of the Drin River. He states that no real addition to the basic Illyrian
population took place until the sixteenth century. Thus Coon provides a different time reference
to the Illyrian settlement than that given by the Encyclopedia of World Cultures. Interestingly, he
believes that the “Northern Mountaineers” origins stem from Bosnia: “[A]t that time Turks
massacred whole villages.... To replace the nearly exterminated population, immigrants arrived
from the land which the first ancestors of the Ghegs had come—Bosnia” (Coon 1950, p. 99).
                                               
32 For discussion of areas of tension between Albania and other nationalities outside Albania, see Zickel and Iwaskiw
(1992), and Vickers and Pettifer (1997).
33 See Encyclopedia for World Cultures (1992).34
Certainly Coon’s results do not invalidate the previous account; however, they highlight the
little discussed “Bosnian” angle, which may be of particular interest when attempting to explain
ethnographic differences between the Northern Mountain Albanians and the rest of the
population.
3.2.1 Linguistic subdivision and differentiation of social organization among
the dominant ethnic group
In 1992, ethnic Albanians were estimated to account for 90 percent of the population. A more
recent estimate states that they make up 97 percent of the population.
34 Among the dominant
Albanian ethnic racial group there are two major subgroups, the Ghegs and the Tosks. There is a
frequently cited, and often observed, difference between two distinct types which stems from
geographical, linguistic ,and cultural differences. The two distinct dialects, whose names are also
the names of the two main regional groups in Albania, comprise the most obvious difference:
Tosk, influenced by Turkish, roughly to the south of the Shkumbin River; and Gheg, with mainly
Romance, Greek, and Slavonic influences, to the north. The Ghegs account for slightly more
than half of the resident Albanian population (Zickel and Iwaskiw 1992).
Although the Tosks and the Ghegs are members of the same ethnic group, the differences in
their lifestyle, language, and regional identity present a potentially destabilizing political and
social cleavage, which was apparent during the communist period and has recently become an
instrument of electoral manipulation. Well into the twentieth century, clans exercised extensive
local authority, particularly in the north. Under the reign of King Zog I (1928–39) some progress
was made toward bringing the clans under government control and eliminating blood feuds.
As early as the late 1940s, the communists imposed controls intended to eliminate clan rule
entirely. Clan identity was seen as a major impediment to the creation of a truly communist state.
Blood feuds were repressed and, in general, ethnic differences were officially ignored in an
attempt to develop a national and cultural socialist solidarity. However, north-south differences
lingered and were implicit in some of the communist policies. Enver Hoxha came from the south
and was a Tosk. He received most of his support from the south and frequently positively
discriminated toward people of Tosk origin. For instance, most party and government executives
were Tosk-dialect speakers. Also the adoption of a “standard literary Albanian language” based
on the Tosk dialect meant that the Ghegs became relatively disadvantaged educationally.
Social organization of the two groups is also distinct and has been documented by a variety
of researchers (Durham 1928; Whitaker 1976; Hasluck 1954). Due mainly to their greater
isolation in the mountainous areas of the north, the Ghegs retained their tribal organization and
customs much more firmly than did the Tosks. The northern codes of behavior adhered to a set
of unwritten tribal bodies of law, or canons.
35 These intricate codes specified comprehensive
systems of behavior and appropriate social relations, from the institutions of marriage and
property to the particularities of how to treat household guests and the types of punishments
given to offenders of the canons. The isolation of the Ghegs from outside influences induced
them to hold fast to tradition. Pride, honor, and dominance characterized the Ghegs’ male.
                                               
34 See Financial Times, Country Survey, Monday, 2 October 1995
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part of this century (Gjecov 1989).35
Historically the Tosks have been less isolated, due mainly to their geographical location.
Contacts with invaders and foreign occupiers have left an influence and, before 1939, some
Tosks had traveled abroad. The clan system among the Tosks began to disappear after
independence was achieved in 1912.
Post-communism has brought some evidence of reemerging cleavages based on the north-
south distinction. As Miall (1995) notes, regional differences underlie the main cleavage between
the Democratic party and the Socialist party. North-south differences have historically found a
reflection in political parties. The south was always a stronghold for the Albanian Party of Labor.
Recent electoral results indicate that it remains a bastion for the Socialist party. The Democratic
party, in contrast, found its strongest support in the northeast, home of Sali Berisha, the ex-leader
of the Albanian Democratic party and the previous president of the country. A clear regional
difference in voting patterns also appeared with the distribution of “yes” votes in the referendum
on the Constitution of October 1994.
36
On the issue of Gheg-Tosk divide, Miall (1995) concludes that although some negative
attitudes and mistrust persist between southerners and northerners, organized conflict between
north and south is unlikely because intraregional differences act as a constraint to organized
conflict. “The most important cleavages seem to be a stronger nationalism in the north, and a
readiness to embrace modernisation in the south. An increase in uncontrolled migration could
intensify north-south mistrust, especially if a land market allows people from the north and south
to buy land in each other’s regions” (Miall 1995, p. 30).
3.3 GENERAL ETHNIC GROUP STATUS UNDER COMMUNISM
During the forty-year tenure of Albanian head of state and communist party leader, Enver
Hoxha, the country was criticized by various foreign governments for pursuing policies that
clearly violated the rights of the ethnic minorities within the country. Athens in particular
repeatedly displayed annoyance with what it termed the “denationalisation” program directed
against the Greek minority. Other points of criticism focused on the disadvantages in the
education system and the intolerance of the Albanian state toward any kind of religion. Under
communism other ethnic minorities faced similar experiences. The Greeks appeared to suffer the
most due primarily to the decision to abolish religion in 1967. As in most countries with Gypsy
populations, the Roma Gypsies remained marginalized. 
Under communism any separate organization by a minority was not allowed. Hoxha
followed a policy of what amounted to tokenism, with a few favored members of the minority
taking prominent positions within the system. The unifying complaint of all minorities was the
lack of access to education in their own respective languages. The policy of having a common
language cannot necessarily be interpreted as discrimination against minorities per se, but rather
it is reflective of the overarching pursuit of socialist unity. In some selective areas a primary
education in Greek was available, but the actual content was identical to that taught to ethnic
Albanian children. Whole areas of Greek history, literature, and culture were excluded, and “the
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toward the northern districts (where Sali Berisha’s roots are).36
role of the Illyrians in the ancient history of the region was exaggerated to the detriment of that
of the Geek colonists from Corinth and elsewhere” (Vickers and Pettifer 1997).
With the exception of access to education in their own languages, the minorities were
treated similarly to the ethnic Albanians.
3.4 THE GREEK MINORITY
The Greek minority, Albania’s largest, has deep roots in the country’s two south-easternmost
districts, Sarande and Girokaster, in an area many Greeks call Northern Epirus.
37 Estimates of
the size of the Greek minority vary and are hotly contested between the Greeks and Albanians.
The estimate depends largely upon how Greek status is defined (whether by blood ancestry, by
use of Greek as a mother tongue, or by religion). The Albanian census of 1989 estimates a
population of about 60,000, using Greek parenthood as a criterion. Greece claims a figure of
200,000–500,000, though it is unclear how this is reached. Similarly Zickel and Iwaskiw (1992)
state that estimates of the Greek population vary from 1 percent of the total (official Albanian
census), to 8 percent (data published by U.S. government), to 12 percent (from the “Epriot
lobby” of Greeks with family roots in Albania). A recent  Financial Times article (1995)
estimates the Greek population at 2 percent of the total.
Vickers and Pettifer (1997) trace the contemporary importance of the Greek minority in
Albania to its historical territorial claims and experience under Albanian communism. Prior to
1945, considerable migration through Albania led to a substantial mixing of the Greek and
Albanian populations. “The ancient Greeks colonised the Albanian coast and Greek-speaking
peoples lived in southern Albania in Strabo’s day” (Miall 1995, p. 14). Enver Hoxha himself was
born and raised in Gjirokaster, a southern town with a substantial Greek minority. He was,
therefore, well aware of the importance of minority issues in Albanian politics.
In 1912–13, Greece claimed much of the “Albanian” adjoining territory known as “Vorio
(North) Epirus” on the basis of decisions taken by the Ambassadors’ Conference held by the
great powers.
38 Under the Protocol of Florence in 1913, Albania was given its present
boundaries, within which there was said to be a Greek minority of 35,000. As early as 1944,
Hoxha was careful to build a constituency within the minority; in March 1944, he commented:
“The people of the Greek minority have proved themselves up to the mark, have fought loyally
and have defended the interests of Albania against Greek reactionary circles.”
39 However,
Vickers and Pettifer (1997) point out that Hoxha’s early writings indicate that he was unaware of
the divisions in the Greek resistance movement and failed to anticipate the outcome of a Greek
civil war.
During the Greek civil war, Hoxha’s main concern was limiting any influence the royalist
right-wing movement in nearby Greek Epirus might have on the Greek minority. Between 1944
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and 1949, the Albanian communists assisted the Greek left in the civil war mainly by providing
safe refuge within Albania to the forces of the Democratic Army. The already existing Greek
minority greatly increased with the addition of a number of left-wing Greek exiles. These exiled
refugees presented a cadre of trained professionals and managers that were quickly utilized by
Hoxha as technocrats especially in Tirana and Vlora. They also proved to be an asset in Hoxha’s
dealings with the culturally conservative majority in the rural areas of the south.
Owing to the incidences of 1945/46, when the Chams
40 were driven out of Greece to
Albania by forces loyal to the royalist wing, the favorable treatment of the Greeks did not last
long. In retaliation Hoxha put an end to any further refuge in Albania for members of the Greek
left. Vickers and Pettifer (1997) interpret these events as forming the basis for the policy toward
the minority as it subsequently evolved under communism and post-communism.
There are competing interpretations concerning the fate of the Greeks under Albanian
communism. Gage concludes that the Greeks were more numerous than other minority groups
and more outwardly religious served to exacerbate the discrimination they faced under
communism, especially with the introduction of an atheist state in 1967. The Greek minority was
subjected to comprehensive repression, such as closure and subsequent demolition of many
churches, burning of religious books, banning of any religious celebrations or holidays, and the
general violation of human rights.
41 Gage (1993) reports that under communism, “Hoxha’s
regime maintained an extensive gulag of twenty-nine prisons and labour camps throughout
Albania that were kept filled with more than thirty thousand enemies of the state year after year.
While ethnic Greeks in Albania were estimated to be about 10 percent of the population of 3.5
million, the proportion of Greek prisoners in Albania’s gulag during the Hoxha years averaged
40 percent” (Gage 1993, p. 19).
After Hoxha’s death in 1985, there appeared to be little formal change in the position of the
minority under his successor, Ramiz Alia. However, the presence of the Sigurimi became less
pervasive in the late 1980s, and mobility across the border for purposes of tourism and health
care became available to certain members of the Greek minority.
42 Although much of the
literature addressing the Greek situation under communism points to the humans rights violations
imposed upon the Greeks and the vehement discrimination they faced, Miall’s observations
temper this view: “[T]he Albanian view is that Hoxha, who came from the south, was relatively
well-disposed towards the Greek minority, offering them schooling in Greek and a measure of
political representation; the repression the minority suffered was no different from that
experienced by the general population” (Miall 1995, p. 15).
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3.4.1 The Greek minority post-communism
Due to the immense social, economic, and political turmoil in the early 1990s, many of the
restrictions on cultural and religious activity began to disappear. Key to the formation of a Greek
civil consciousness in the early years of post-communism was the breakdown, at the end of
December 1989, of the security system that had prevailed along all Albanian borders for at least
a generation. This led to an immediate exodus of hundreds of Albanians into Greece and other
countries. The subsequent contact with Greeks living across the border promoted the formation
of various social and political organizations. In February 1990, a human rights group known as
OMONIA was founded to promote the interests of the Greek minority.
43
Nevertheless, relations with Greece deteriorated sharply following the end of communism.
A radical wing of OMONIA called for revision of the border; the chair of OMONIA called for
autonomy for “Northern Epirus” on the basis that the rights provided for under the Albanian
constitution were highly precarious. This latter proposal was rejected, thus spurring the radicals
in OMONIA to call for Enosis, “Union in Greece.” The situation worsened in 1993, when the
Albanian government expelled a Greek priest on the basis that he was preaching Enosis. Ethnic
Greek village leaders were harassed and some Greek schools were closed. Greece responded
with the expulsion of over 2,000 ethnic Albanians from Greece into Albania, where the Berisha
government allowed them to stay. In 1994, Greek-Albanian relationships again deteriorated
when an unidentified group attacked an Albanian military post in Peshkopi, killing two
Albanians. The Albanian government retaliated by arresting five leading members of OMONIA;
Greece responded with a further expulsion of 70,000 illegal Albanian immigrants and vetoed an
EU loan to Albania of 35 million ECU. The OMONIA “five” were charged with treason and
espionage and were convicted. According to some international observers, the televised trials
were little more than traditional political show-trials. The historical link between the Greeks and
the Serbs for the partition of Albania resurfaced.
Thus at the end of 1994 the political position of the Greek minority remained insecure and
entangled with international intrigue. Strong pressure from international organizations such as
Amnesty International and various Greek groups caused the release of the OMONIA five in
1995. Bilateral relations improved with a change of government in Greece in late 1995. There
was a general improvement in the Balkan atmosphere following the Dayton peace agreements.
The Serbs became the target of international censure and the Greeks may have decided to reduce
their hopes for annexation of southern Albanian territory. In March 1996, a “New Friendship and
Cooperation Agreement” was signed, which included setting up a number of joint commissions
to address issues of border security and education, among others.
Despite these possible conflicts, both Albania and Greece have common interests in
avoiding a conflict. Albania cannot afford to alienate Greece, which is host to 300,000 Albania
migrants who send back a significant contribution to Albanian income—about $400 million a
year. Also, Albania is eager to achieve further integration into European economic and political
structures, and policies of ethnic tolerance clearly serve to boost its chances. Thus Albania needs
good relations with Greece for both economic and security reasons. Greece, on the other hand, is
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interested in seeing the Albanian economy stabilize to avoid becoming flooded with more
Albanian refugees. They also have a keen interest in supporting the Greek minority in Albania.
A recent study by Miall (1995) claims that relations between Greek-speaking and Albanian-
speaking populations are good in both towns and villages. He found no evidence of interethnic
hostility at grass-roots levels. Although Greek speakers sometimes perceive that they suffered
discrimination in the past and feel a grievance over education, Albanians tend to deny that
Greeks were treated worse than anybody else and feel that they already have better schools.
The report of the High Commissioner on National Minorities stated that Albania meets
OSCE standards on minority protection, though the closing of schools has been a specific source
of tension. The minority’s main educational demands have been for more teaching in Greek at
the secondary and higher levels and the opening of religious and private schools.
3.4.2 Recent fieldwork
The increase in the unemployment and inflation rates and the general deterioration in living
standards since the fall of the communist regime have affected the Greek minority as much as
anyone else. However, generally speaking, the material situation of the Greek minority in
Albania has improved substantially following the end of communism, for they have been able to
migrate and acquire working visas for Greece much more easily than ethnic Albanians. The
Greek minority is also better placed than other ethnic groups with respect to obtaining
remittances from abroad. It is likely that if intergroup conflicts develop, it will be the Albanians
rather than the Greeks who will feel aggrieved. Albanians generally have larger families than
ethnic Greeks. Since they are predominantly Muslims, they stand very little chance of obtaining
a working visa for Greece. Thus it is typical to witness obviously different living conditions
between the two groups in the South. The relatively poor living conditions of the ethnic
Albanians has led to resentment against Greece and the Greek minority.
Fieldwork observations by Di Paolo (1995) confirm the relatively advantageous position of
the Greek minority in southern Albania. His case study, which compares economic and social
indicators of three areas in Gjirokaster, describes some ethnic tensions, varying standards of
living between ethnic groups, and differences in the relative dependence upon land as a means of
survival. In the fertile Dropulli plain, occupied predominantly by the Greek minority, “villages
seem desolate and land is abandoned” (ibid.). Di Paolo explains that this is due to the relative
ease at which the Greek minority can obtain work visas for Greece. The family economic
strategy follows a model of “maximum investment in immigrating to Greece and the minimum
investment in the use of their land.”
In contrast, Di Paolo (1995) found that the strategy for economic survival is different in
some villages on “the other side of the river.” In the village of Suha, the population is
predominantly ethnic Albanian. They have more difficulties in emigrating than the Greek
Albanians and thus land necessarily becomes the most important basis for survival.
Unfortunately the land in the mountains is stony and difficult to cultivate compared to the
expanse of abandoned land in the Dropulli plain. It is sadly ironic that the families least
interested in cultivating land are those with the better quality land. Vickers and Pettifer (1997)
see this a direct result of the land redistribution policies carried out under the Berisha
government that essentially favored the Greek minority over the ethnic Albanians.40
3.4.3 Land distribution and the Greek minority
It has been suggested that Berisha’s land privatization program was a cause of considerable
tension between the Greek minority and the ethnic Albanians in the early 1990s. Many southern
ethnic Albanians considered Berisha’s land program to display excessively favorable treatment
of Greek villages. The frequently cited reason for this is that the ethnic Albanians from the Greek
minority areas lacked political influence in Tirana. As southerners and Tosks they were viewed
as having an affinity with communism whereas the Greeks were largely anticommunist. Berisha
may have felt that a generous treatment of the Greeks’ claims would help settle some political
issues and would encourage more visas and investment from Greece. However, in reality we
observe, on the one hand, land-hungry Albanians who rely on farming as a means of subsistence
and, on the other hand, land-rich ethnic Greeks who have no incentive to farm due to more
attractive income opportunities in Greece.
3.4.4 Future concerns
From this brief analysis of the situation of the Greek minority in Albanian, it is possible to
discern a few areas of potential concern. First, it has been noticed that following a new
“Friendship and Cooperation Agreement,”
44 there has been no obvious attempt by the Albanian
government to boost Greek-language education in Albania. Second, there exists potential social
conflict with regard to the discriminatory issuance of visas and the “unfair” distribution of land.
At the economic level, the expulsion of a substantial number of Albanians from Greece after
the OMONIA trial will have serious long-term effects on the economy, for remittances constitute
a large part of gross domestic product (GDP), and on the welfare system. From the Greek side,
there seems to be a growing intolerance toward large-scale immigration. So the future of the
whole community is unclear and will depend primarily on the state of bilateral relations and on
other regional conflicts, including Kosova, where the Greek-Serbia alliance may produce
suspicions within Albania..
3.5 THE VLACHS
After the Greeks, the Vlachs are the largest minority. The number of Vlachs living in Albania is
not precisely known. Winnifrith (1995) approximates 50,000, whereas Vickers and Pettifer
(1997) estimate around 80,000. The Vlachs are predominantly transhumant shepherds and are
distributed widely in villages and towns in the south and southeast of Albania (mainly Korça,
Gjirokaster, and Vlora). They are Greek Orthodox. They have taken opportunities to work
abroad through contacts with Vlachs in other countries and have improved their standard of
living.
The Vlachs in Albania form part of a large linguistic group, scattered throughout the
Balkans, which speaks a derivative of Latin language. For this reason they are sometimes
thought of as a Romanian minority (there are Vlachs who believe they came from southern
Romania, where a dialect is spoken similar to that of Vlach). Winnifrith (1995) postulates that
the Vlachs may derive from Latin-speaking groups left behind when Slav invaders broke through
the frontier of the Eastern Roman Empire on the Danube in the seventh century. In the late
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Ottoman Empire, many Vlachs lived in the high mountain areas throughout the Balkans as
shepherds and transporters of goods. However, due to economic changes most have moved down
to cities or villages and given up transhumancy.
In Albania, following World War II and the closing of the border, the Vlachs found
themselves trapped and forced to give up their pastoral migrations. “The destruction of the
Vlach’s traditional patterns of pastoral life by collectivisation caused them to be relatively
assimilated under communism” (Vickers and Pettifer 1997, p. 201). As a result of this change
many Vlachs were obliged to find work in the new industrial centers in southern Albania. Unlike
the Greek minority, who had irredentist backers in a neighboring state, the Vlachs lacked this
support and thus did not pose the same threat to the established Albanian culture. They also
lacked a strong religious identity that might limit their assimilation into an officially atheist state.
They did, however, suffer cultural restrictions similar to other minorities under communism; for
instance, their language had no official status.
Since 1990, the Vlachs have begun to reassert their identity. A Vlach association was
formed in 1990, and a Vlach congress was held in Tirana in 1992. Many Vlachs now live in the
towns in Albania and are practically fully assimilated. Many are successful professionals and the
younger generation is losing the Vlach language. There is no education in Vlach, which until
recently was not a written language.
Miall (1995) found that some Vlachs feel that they have more respect now than in the
communist time and they now have full human rights and freedom to organize. The main
demands of the Vlachs are to “enjoy all ethnocultural rights like all the ethnic communities of
other European countries” and to have conditions that will enable them to “learn their own
language and develop their religious and cultural ceremonies in the same language.” Miall
(1995) found evidence of intermarriage between Orthodox Vlachs and Moslem Albanians, thus
suggesting a high level of tolerance between the two groups.
Vlachs are divided into those who accept a Romanian origin and those who deny that origin.
This division has led to a split in the Romanian cultural movement. There are now two Vlach
associations, which are trying to resolve their differences. Romania supports those who believe
their origins are Romanian while Vlachs in the south are prepared to accept a Greek identity. In
general, the Vlachs in Albania consider themselves Albanians as well as Vlachs. Miall (1995)
encountered no evidence of interethnic tension or conflict between Vlachs and Albanians. He
also found no signs of resentment or discrimination directed against the Vlachs.
Di Paolo (1995) documents the cases of two villages in Gjirokaster where Vlachs of Greek
origin reside. An important difference between the villages is their relative composition of
Vlachs and ethnic Albanians. In the village of Stegopolli, 80 percent of the population is Greek-
Vlach and 20 percent is ethnic Albanian while the reverse is true in the village of Suha.
Interestingly, Di Paolo observes land conflicts in the former but not in the latter. In Stegopolli,
prior to 1946, the land belonged to “rich Albanian owners” who have made and continue to make
restitution claims on their old properties. Since the Vlachs comprise the majority of the
population in this village and the land commission of 1991/1992 was constituted mainly of
Vlachs, these restitution claims were not recognized. Further, the commission did not allow the
ex-owners to take the legal land allotment from within their former properties. The ethnic
Albanian villagers decided not to sign their title deeds but instead accepted land in usufruct with
the presumption that one day they would acquire the right to their old lands. Thus land conflicts42
have arisen and “today this conflict is becoming worse.” As a result, many of the Vlachs feel
insecure over their future land rights. In Suha, however, where the population is predominantly
native, land has been distributed equally and according to the law. The findings of this case study
prove complex to explain because one could erroneously interpret the land problem in Stegopolli
as an ethnic problem. However, knowledge of a multitude of other land problems in Albania
suggests that the conflict may be between old village families and newcomers, regardless of their
ethnicity. Di Paolo (1995) explains the lack of conflict in this village as a result of the history of
landownership in the village.
3.6 THE SLAV-SPEAKING MINORITIES
The Slav-speaking minorities—Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Bulgarians—are among
the most isolated inhabitants of Albania. They live mainly in the remote northwest mountains
and near the shores of Lake Ohrid and Prespa.
3.6.1 The Macedonians
The Slav-speaking Macedonian minority is concentrated in villages in the area to the south of
Peshkopi (approximately 3,000, who speak Macedonian and Serbian) and on a strip on the
western shore of Lake Prespa (about 4,500, who speak a Macedonian dialect closer to
Bulgarian). The northern group are Moslems; the group near Lake Prespa are Orthodox.
“The northern group have good relations with the neighbouring Albanian villages. Their
main concern is difficulty of finding jobs and the limited size of their land holdings” (Miall 1995,
p. 19). Their main demands concern better access to Macedonia, that is, free visas, free car
insurance, and the right to study in Macedonia. There is no real prospect of a school in the
Macedonian language in this area.
“The southern group live in an isolated area of compact settlement along lake Prespa where
several villages form a group of almost entirely Macedonian-speaking villagers. This group has
ready access to Macedonia and members go there to work” (Miall 1995, p. 19). The Slavs
located in this area are better known as Gorani, or sometimes Bulgareci, since they speak what is
in essence a dialect of Bulgarian. This group has residual elements of population dating back to
the medieval Bulgarian and Serbian empires in the Balkans. They had no independent
organization under communism and suffered cultural discrimination. Today they are somewhat
better off than ethnic Albanian villages. They have their own primary school taught in
Macedonian and their main demand is for secondary school to be taught in Macedonian.
Relations with Albanians are good and there is intermarriage.
Like the Serbs and Montenegrins, some Bulgareci eventually crossed into the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to find work after the collapse of communism in Albania. “In
1991 Radio Korça began broadcasting in Macedonian for several hours a day, and in September
the Ministry of Justice approved the creation of a political association for the Slav-speaking
community, at first called Bratska and later named Prespa” (Vickers and Pettifer 1997, p. 205).
The main demand of the organization relates to education in Slav language. It has been said that
one reason why the Albanians may resist the emergence of substantially independent
“Macedonian” political culture is because many Albanians think of communism as a Slav43
phenomenon, a belief that cannot be overemphasized (ibid., p. 206). Miall (1995) found no signs
of interethnic conflict involving these groups and ethnic Albanians.
3.6.2 The Montenegrin Serbians
The estimated size of this group is hotly contested between Albania and Yugoslavia. Belgrade
estimates the figure to be around 45,000, while the official Albania census puts estimates at
around 100. The position of this minority is delicate due to the bad relations between the two
governments.
About 2,000 Serbs and Montenegrins have traditionally lived in and around Shkoder. Most
of this community arrived in Albania only in the Zogist period after 1926 and between 1938 and
1948. Relationships with Serbia and Montenegro were much better under Zog than at other
periods and migration across borders was possible. Many of this minority left Albania after the
end of communism and went to Yugoslavia. However, the only place the Yugoslavs offered
them to live was Kosova. Due to problems in Kosova, they chose to return to Albania. The chief
grievances of this minority are the lack of schooling in the Serbian language and the lack of
official recognition of the minority. An association was set up in 1991 to campaign for the
community’s rights.
3.7 THE GYPSIES
The Gypsy population has been estimated at around 50,000. Gypsies fall into two distinct
groups: Yvgjet and Roma. The Yvgjet are lighter-skinned and mainly speak Albanian. The
Roma are darker-skinned and speak a distinct language.
The Yvgjet believe they came to Albania from Egypt hundreds of years ago. They have
lived a settled life for many decades and report that they have the same education as Albanians.
They are Moslem. In the south there is evidence of intermarriage and reports of no
discrimination. The Yvgjet in Tirana complain of prejudice by the majority and believe they face
discrimination in access to housing and education.
The Roma are considered by the great majority to be a “lower caste” in Albanian society.
They have always suffered a great deal of discrimination and prejudice, and this has not changed
under post-communism. They are frequently referred to as “blacks.” Miall (1995) cites a survey
of Albanian opinion on the environment that showed 35 percent of Albanians consider the Roma
as “an environmental problem.” There is little intermarriage between Romas and any other ethnic
group. They have access to limited education and suffer severe discrimination in housing. During
the communist time they were the poorest members of society and discriminated against
severely. The Roma are divided into four tribes and it is reported that there is mutual hostility
among them. They are not organized, so any form of organized ethnic conflict between them and
the Albanians seems improbable.
Vickers and Pettifer (1997, p. 202) observe that there has been “no easily identifiable change
in the position of the Roma since the end of communism, except that the collapse of the planned
economy has tended to encourage traditional Gypsy trades.”44
3.8 THE ARMENIANS AND THE JEWS
“There are about 800 Armenians in Albania” (Vickers and Pettifer 1997, p. 206). They are
located mainly in Tirana and Vlora. Many of them came to Albania after the genocide in Antolia
during World War I. During World War II many of them supported the partisans and thus gained
favor in the eyes of Hoxha. For this reason they were spared much of the discrimination that
other minority groups faced during communism. Most Albania-Armenians are highly educated
and the community belongs to the Orthodox tradition. Intermarriage is generally confined to
Orthodox Albanians. In 1993–95, many leading members of the community emigrated to Greece
after having made close links with the energetic and wealthy Armenian community in
Thessaloniki.
Albania’s Jewish community has never numbered more than 1,000 during the twentieth
century. It was centered in Vlora where there has been a Jewish settlement since late antiquity.
During the German occupation the Jews went into hiding, sheltered by Albanian families, and
thus the community survived almost intact. Nearly the whole Jewish population migrated to




Property systems in Albania until the late 1940s were based on patrilineal, family-property
tenure. This traditional concept of family property considered the family to be the owner, and a
person’s right to family property was determined by gender and family position. Within
Albania’s patrilineal social structure, family-land tenure bestowed greater property rights to male
family members, particularly household heads, than to women and junior men, regardless of
ethnic background.
Privatization of socialist and state property since 1990 has created a legal property structure
based on private property, equity with regard to both gender and ethnicity, and market principles.
Within this private property system, legislation recognizes both individual and family property.
While family-property legislation supports some aspects of customary family property, it also
recognizes that all family members have the same and equal property rights. Unfortunately, some
provisions of the legislation on family property (confined to agricultural land) contradict other
property legislation such as inheritance codes. In addition, some family-farm property provisions
are ambiguous (e.g., no definition of the farm family is provided) and incomplete (e.g., how
family-farm property and family members’ ownership rights will be handled in land
transactions). Property legislation is ethnic neutral in the sense that it neither makes reference to
nor bases restrictions on ethnic affiliation.
Traditional norms regarding family, gender, and male dominance appear to have survived
forty years of socialism and equity policies.
46 Attitudes regarding family property and women’s
rights to landed property have also remained largely unchanged. In part, this may be due to the
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fact that private property in Albania historically existed only under patriarchal society. Another
possible factor contributing to this return to customary norms is a rejection by the population of
the socialist state and its policies, including policies that promoted gender equality.
47 Analysis of
unstructured fieldwork and two survey data sets has revealed that while, there is some regional
variation, in practice and in attitude a large proportion of Albanian families continue to observe
customary norms regarding property. For example, attitudes regarding inheritance show an
overwhelming preference for sons and other male relatives as heirs over wives and daughters.
And allocation of family land to married children occurs when sons marry; it seldom happens for
daughters.
Thus, while statutory law guarantees all Albanians equal rights to property ownership, equal
inheritance, equal education, and, in general, equal opportunities in the new Albanian society, the
survival or resurgence of customary attitudes and practices with regard to family landownership
and property rights may effectively restrict these rights for some persons, particularly women.
Two types of conflict, therefore, have emerged with regard to intrafamily property rights:
(1) conflict between legislation that recognizes equal property rights for all Albanians and
customary tenure practices that deny some family members, particularly women, equal
ownership rights to family property; and (2) contradictions between certain legislative provisions
regarding individual and family property rights.
To understand the emerging land-tenure structure and its potential impact on the land market
and agricultural production, one needs to consider customary family norms, attitudes, and
practices. One conclusion from the analysis presented in this paper is that there are actually three
tenure structures: the formal or statutory tenure structure, the historic customary structure, and
the structure currently being formed by practice. This last form appears to be a combination of
the statutory and the customary, in varying combinations, as families work out the tension
between individual private property and family property and between customary family-land
tenure and the legal property structure. While the development of a market economy and the
commercialization of the rural economy are crucial, social factors such as gender, and ethnicity
to a lesser degree, will also influence how this tension is resolved.
It is clear that where traditional norms are still observed, de facto property rights in land and
inheritance practices conform to Albanian patrilineal custom, regardless of formal legislation.
This is not to say that customary practices are immutable, since there are instances where
customary rules and behavior have changed, mostly as a result of strong pressures from
outside—such as Muslim customs in the south during the Ottoman Empire and the Catholic
church in northern Albania which repressed some of the more extreme customs (as documented
by Durham 1928). Recent fieldwork and survey results also suggest that some attitudes such as
extension of family property rights to family members beyond the nuclear family are changing,
resulting in less strict adherence to customary norms. In this case, the diminishing occurrence
and role of the extended family with the consequent growing importance of the nuclear family
structure contribute to these changes in customary tenure practices.
What is not clear is what will happen to family-farm property as land becomes an asset and
land transactions increase. The opening of land markets will almost certainly expose the tensions
                                               
47 While there is little written in English regarding the status of women during the socialist period, Gjergji (1975) and
Fistani (n.d.) have made some reference to the issue.46
between customary law and formal legislation and the contradictions contained within formal
law. The family as a social unit has given Albanian society a strong basis to withstand invasions
(both military and sociocultural) from surrounding countries over the centuries. And family
property has played an important role in strengthening this family unit. There still exists a strong
commitment to the  family unit in Albania, and individualization of property rights may be
socially and culturally unacceptable to many Albanians, particularly in rural areas where a
family’s identity is closely tied to the land. The reality of a market economy, however, may
cause traditional family ownership to evolve into a more individualized form.
Nonrecognition of equal rights for family members other than the household head presents a
problem, for example, when the farm manager is not the household head, particularly if the
manager is a woman working under the gender biases of a patriarchal society. As results from
one survey revealed, 21 percent of farms are managed by women; yet in only 7 percent of these
farms is the woman the titleholder. As market and land transactions become more common, lack
of clear ownership rights will put these women farm managers at a disadvantage because they
will not be able to participate in commercial transactions, thus compromising their production
potential. Effective ownership rights of family members need to be explicitly recognized and
protected if they are to efficiently manage the family  farm enterprise. Recognition of equal
ownership rights for all family members would be consistent with the  intent and spirit of
property legislation in Albania and with the country’s efforts to work toward a democratic
society.
With regard to the ethnic question, Albania is relatively homogeneous ethnically compared
to other Balkan countries. The Greek minority appeared to fare worst under the communist
regime; this was primarily due to conflict with the Greek Orthodox church after the pro-atheist
campaigns of 1967. Although other groups faced discrimination in education, there does not
appear to be substantial evidence that they were treated worse than ethnic Albanians. Pastoral
and nomadic groups such as some Gypsies and the Vlachs were required to settle in towns and
collectives during the communist regime and subsequently were relatively well assimilated. The
Roma Gypsies were perhaps the only group to remain consistently marginalized from larger
society and this seems to be the case even today.
Most minorities in contemporary Albania appear to be equally affected by the turbulent
economic, social, and political transitions that are under way. The Greek minority is the only
ethnic group relatively large and politically organized enough to potentially be an unstable group
in the south at present. This minority, along with some others such as the Serbian and
Montenegrin Slavs, holds a relative advantage in being able to alleviate some of these transition
costs by accessing alternative sources of income outside Albania. This advantage could be the
source of social unrest, particularly when it is compounded by the fact that many of the migrants
are leaving good land uncultivated inside Albania. This is of particular concern in the southern
districts where there is evidence that due to the political climate at the time of the land
distribution, some of the Greek minority received better quality lands than ethnic Albanians.
These ethnic Albanians do not generally have alternative income sources and thus rely on
subsistence farming as a survival strategy. The visual presence of good quality uncultivated land
creates social tension in this area.
In summary, it is difficult to determine whether potential land conflicts between ethnic
groups are directly attributable to ethnic differences or whether they are the result of policies
pursued under both communist and post-communist regimes. For instance, under the communist47
regimes ethnic minority groups were obliged to settle on land or relocate to land that formerly
belonged to ethnic Albanians; these groups are still considered newcomers with lesser rights to
redistributed land. One study of two villages with mixed ethnic composition in the southern
district of Gjirokaster provides some evidence that land conflicts are based on historical
ownership rights rather than on ethnic differences (Di Paolo 1995). Further case studies should
be undertaken to more fully understand the dynamics of these relationships and to better
anticipate areas of conflict.
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